

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

~~25~~
file

*L.F.
Haw*

April 24, 1945.

*sent
4-25-45*

Dear Mr. President:

I think it is very important that I should have a talk with you as soon as possible on a highly secret matter.

I mentioned it to you shortly after you took office but have not urged it since on account of the pressure you have been under. It, however, has such a bearing on our present foreign relations and has such an important effect upon all my thinking in this field that I think you ought to know about it without much further delay.

286

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Hinson

Secretary of War.

225



The President,
The White House.

Ma H

*Put on list
tomorrow, Wed. 25.
H.L.*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 1(b) and 1(d) = (3)

OSD Secy, April 12, 1974

By NLT/4, NARS Date 2-2-76

SECRET

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

White House Central File
Confidential

[July 16, 1945]

At 3:30 P.M. Mr. Sec. Byrnes,
Adm (5 star) Leahy and I left
in an open car for Berlin,
followed by my two aides
and various and sundry se-
cret service and military
guards and preceded by a
two star general in a closed
car with a couple of plain
clothes men to fool even if
they wanted to do any target
practice of consequence on the
Pres. They didn't.

We received the Second
Armoured Division and
tied a citation on the guidon
of Co. E 17th Armoured Engr. Bn.
Gen Collier who seemed to

--U-707

Know his stuff, put us in
a reconnaissance car built
with side seats and no top
just like a hoodlum wagon
minus the top on a fire
truck with seats and no hose
and we drove slowly down a
mile and a half of good col-
dies and some million of
dollars worth of equipment-
which had amply paid its way
to Berlin.

Then we went on to Berlin
and saw absolute ruin.
Hitler's folly. He overreached
himself by trying to take in
too much territory. He had
no morals and his people
lacked him up. Here did

PSF. 322

I see a more sorrowful
sight, nor witness retribution
to the nth degree.

The most sorrowful part
of the situation is the dehumanized
Hitlerian populace. Of course
the Russians have raped
the able bodied and I suppose
have made compulsory work-
men of them. They have also
looted every house left stand-
ing and have sent the loot
to Russia. But Hitler did the
same thing to them.

It is the Golden Rule in
reverse - and it is not a
uplifting sight. What a
pity that the human animal
is not able to put his moral
thinking into practice!

558-729

We saw old men, old women,
young women, children from
40s to teens carrying packs
pushing carts, pulling carts,
wretchedly ejected by the con-
querors and carrying what
they could of their belongings
to nowhere in particular.

I thought of Carthage, Babylon,
Jerusalem, Rome, Atlanta,
Peking, Babylon, Nineveh;
Scipio, Romulus II, Titus,
Herman, Sherman, Genghis
Khan, Alexander, Darius
the Great - but Hitler only
destroyed Stalingrad - and
Berlin. I hope for some

sort of peace - but I
fear that machines are
ahead of morals by some
centuries and when morals
catch up perhaps there'll
be no reason for any of it.

I hope not. But we are
only termites in a planet
and maybe when we bore
too deeply into the planet
there'll be a reckoning - who
knows?



PSF-322 Chas. Ross

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

18 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

SUBJECT: The Test.

1. This is not a concise, formal military report but an attempt to recite what I would have told you if you had been here on my return from New Mexico.

2. At 0530, 16 July 1945, in a remote section of the Alamogordo Air Base, New Mexico, the first full scale test was made of the implosion type atomic fission bomb. For the first time in history there was a nuclear explosion.

And what an explosion!



The bomb was not dropped from an airplane but was exploded on a platform on top of a 100-foot high steel tower.

3. The test was successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone. Based on the data which it has been possible to work up to date, I estimate the energy generated to be in excess of the equivalent of 15,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT; and this is a conservative estimate. Data based on measurements which we have not yet been able to reconcile would make the energy release several times the conservative figure. There were tremendous blast effects.



18 July 1945

For a brief period there was a lighting effect within a radius of 20 miles equal to several suns in midday; a huge ball of fire was formed which lasted for several seconds. This ball mushroomed and rose to a height of over ten thousand feet before it dimmed. The light from the explosion was seen clearly at Albuquerque, Santa Fe, Silver City, El Paso and other points generally to about 180 miles away. The sound was heard to the same distance in a few instances but generally to about 100 miles. Only a few windows were broken although one was some 125 miles away. A massive cloud was formed which surged and billowed upward with tremendous power, reaching the stratosphere at an elevation of 41,000 feet, 36,000 feet above the ground, in about five minutes, breaking without interruption through a temperature inversion at 17,000 feet which most of the scientists thought would stop it. Two supplementary explosions occurred in the cloud shortly after the main explosion. The cloud contained several thousand tons of dust picked up from the ground and a considerable amount of iron in the gaseous form. Our present thought is that this iron ignited when it mixed with the oxygen in the air to cause these supplementary explosions. Huge concentrations of highly radioactive materials resulted from the fission and were contained in this cloud.

4. A crater from which all vegetation had vanished, with a diameter of 1200 feet and a slight slope toward the center, was formed. In the center was a shallow bowl 130 feet in diameter and 6 feet in depth. The material within the crater was deeply pulverized dirt. The material within the outer circle is greenish and can be distinctly seen from as much as 5 miles away. The steel from the tower was evaporated. 1500 feet away there was a four-inch iron pipe 16 feet high set in concrete and strongly guyed. It disappeared completely.

18 July 1945

5. One-half mile from the explosion there was a massive steel test cylinder weighing 220 tons. The base of the cylinder was solidly encased in concrete. Surrounding the cylinder was a strong steel tower 70 feet high, firmly anchored to concrete foundations. This tower is comparable to a steel building bay that would be found in typical 15 or 20 story skyscraper or in warehouse construction. Forty tons of steel were used to fabricate the tower which was 70 feet high, the height of a six story building. The cross bracing was much stronger than that normally used in ordinary steel construction. The absence of the solid walls of a building gave the blast a much less effective surface to push against. The blast tore the tower from its foundations, twisted it, ripped it apart and left it flat on the ground. The effects on the tower indicate that, at that distance, unshielded permanent steel and masonry buildings would have been destroyed. I no longer consider the Pentagon a safe shelter from such a bomb. Enclosed are a sketch showing the tower before the explosion and a telephotograph showing what it looked like afterwards. None of us had expected it to be damaged.

6. The cloud traveled to a great height first in the form of a ball, then mushroomed, then changed into a long trailing chimney-shaped column and finally was sent in several directions by the variable winds at the different elevations. It deposited its dust and radioactive materials over a wide area. It was followed and monitored by medical doctors and scientists with instruments to check its radioactive effects. While here and there the activity on the ground was fairly high, at no place did it reach a concentration which required evacuation of the population. Radio-



18 July 1945

✓ active material in small quantities was located as much as 120 miles away. The measurements are being continued in order to have adequate data with which to protect the Government's interests in case of future claims. For a few hours I was none too comfortable about the situation.

7. For distances as much as 200 miles away, observers were stationed to check on blast effects, property damage, radioactivity and reactions of the population. While complete reports have not yet been received, I now know that no persons were injured nor was there any real property damage outside our Government area. As soon as all the voluminous data can be checked and correlated, full technical studies will be possible.

✓ WEATHER
July 13

8. Our long range weather predictions had indicated that we could expect weather favorable for our tests beginning on the morning of the 17th and continuing for four days. This was almost a certainty if we were to believe our long range forecasters. The prediction for the morning of the 16th was not so certain but there was about an 80% chance of the conditions being suitable. During the night there were thunder storms with lightning flashes all over the area. The test had been originally set for 0400 hours and all the night through, because of the bad weather, there were urgings from many of the scientists to postpone the test. Such a delay might well have had crippling results due to mechanical difficulties in our complicated test set-up. Fortunately, we disregarded the urgings. We held fire and waited the night through hoping for suitable weather. We had to delay an hour and a half, to 0530, before we could fire. This was 30 minutes before sunrise.

18 July 1945

9. Because of bad weather, our two B-29 observation airplanes were unable to take off as scheduled from Kirtland Field at Albuquerque and when they finally did get off, they found it impossible to get over the target because of the heavy clouds and the thunder storms. Certain desired observations could not be made and while the people in the airplanes saw the explosion from a distance, they were not as close as they will be in action. We still have no reason to anticipate the loss of our plane in an actual operation although we cannot guarantee safety.

10. Just before 1100 the news stories from all over the state started to flow into the Albuquerque Associated Press. I then directed the issuance by the Commanding Officer, Alamogordo Air Base of a news release as shown on the inclosure. With the assistance of the Office of Censorship we were able to limit the news stories to the approved release supplemented in the local papers by brief stories from the many eyewitnesses not connected with our project. One of these was a blind woman who saw the light.

11. Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell was at the control shelter located 10,000 yards south of the point of explosion. His impressions are given below:

540
IX
"The scene inside the shelter was dramatic beyond words. In and around the shelter were some twenty-odd people concerned with last minute arrangements prior to firing the shot. Included were: Dr. Oppenheimer, the Director who had borne the great scientific burden of

18 July 1945.

Memorandum for Secretary of War

developing the weapon from the raw materials made in Tennessee and Washington and a dozen of his key assistants -- Dr. Kistiskowsky, who developed the highly special explosive; Dr. Bainbridge, who supervised all the detailed arrangements for the test; Dr. Hubbard, the weather expert, and several others. Besides these, there were a handful of soldiers, two or three Army officers and one Naval officer. The shelter was cluttered with a great variety of instruments and radios.

For some hectic two hours preceding the blast, General Groves stayed with the Director, walking with him and steadying his tense excitement. Every time the Director would be about to explode because of some untoward happening, General Groves would take him off and walk with him in the rain, counselling with him and reassuring him that everything would be all right. At twenty minutes before zero hour, General Groves left for his station at the base camp, first because it provided a better observation point and second, because of our rule that he and I must not be together in situations where there is an element of danger, which existed at both points.

Just after General Groves left, announcements began to be broadcast of the interval remaining before the blast. They were sent by radio to the other groups participating in and observing the test. As the time interval grew smaller and changed from minutes to seconds, the tension increased by leaps and bounds. Everyone in that room knew the awful potentialities of the thing that they thought was about to happen. The scientists felt that their figuring must be right and



18 July 1945

I
IX
will

that the bomb had to go off but there was in everyone's mind a strong measure of doubt. The feeling of many could be expressed by "Lord, I believe; help Thou mine unbelief." We were reaching into the unknown and we did not know what might come of it. It can be safely said that most of those present—Christian, Jew and Atheist—were praying and praying harder than they had ever prayed before. If the shot were successful, it was a justification of the several years of intensive effort of tens of thousands of people—statesmen, scientists, engineers, manufacturers, soldiers, and many others in every walk of life.

I
+
IX

"In that brief instant in the remote New Mexico desert the tremendous effort of the brains and brawn of all these people came suddenly and startlingly to the fullest fruition. Dr. Oppenheimer, on whom had rested a very heavy burden, grew tenser as the last seconds ticked off. He scarcely breathed. He held on to a post to steady himself. For the last few seconds, he stared directly ahead and then when the announcer shouted "Now!" and there came this tremendous burst of light followed shortly thereafter by the deep growling roar of the explosion, his face relaxed into an expression of tremendous relief. Several of the observers standing back of the shelter to watch the lighting effects were knocked flat by the blast.

✓

"The tension in the room let up and all started congratulating each other. Everyone sensed "This is it!" No matter what might happen now all knew that the impossible scientific job had been done. Atomic fission would no longer be hidden in the cloisters of the theoretical physicists' dreams. It was almost full grown at birth. It was a great

18 July 1945.

new force to be used for good or for evil. There was a feeling in that shelter that those concerned with its nativity should dedicate their lives to the mission that it would always be used for good and never for evil.

X "Dr. Kistiakowsky, the impulsive Russian, threw his arms
around Dr. Oppenheimer and embraced him with shouts of glee. Others were equally enthusiastic. All the pent-up emotions were released in those few minutes and all seemed to sense immediately that the explosion had far exceeded the most optimistic expectations and wildest hopes of the scientists. All seemed to feel that they had been present at the birth of a new age—The Age of Atomic Energy—and felt their profound responsibility to help in guiding into right channels the tremendous forces which had been unlocked for the first time in history.

XI "As to the present war, there was a feeling that no matter what else might happen, we now had the means to insure its speedy conclusion and save thousands of American lives. As to the future, there had been brought into being something big and something new that would prove to be immeasurably more important than the discovery of electricity or any of the other great discoveries which have so affected our existence.

XI "The effects could well be called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous and terrifying. No man-made phenomenon of such tremendous power had ever occurred before. The lighting effects beggared description. The whole country was lighted by a searing light

18 July 1945.

X
with the intensity many times that of the midday sun. It was golden, purple, violet, gray and blue. It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of the nearby mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be seen to be imagined. It was that beauty the great poets dream about but describe most poorly and inadequately. Thirty seconds after the explosion came first, the air blast pressing hard against the people and things, to be followed almost immediately by the strong, sustained, awesome roar which warned of doomsday and made us feel that we puny things were blasphemous to dare tamper with the forces heretofore reserved to The Almighty. Words are inadequate tools for the job of acquainting those not present with the physical, mental and psychological effects. It had to be witnessed to be realized."

12. My impressions of the night's high points follow:

VIII
After about an hour's sleep I got up at 0100 and from that time on until about five I was with Dr. Oppenheimer constantly. Naturally he was nervous, although his mind was working at its usual extraordinary efficiency. I devoted my entire attention to shielding him from the excited and generally faulty advice of his assistants who were more than disturbed by their excitement and the uncertain weather conditions. By 0330 we decided that we could probably fire at 0530. By 0400 the rain had stopped but the sky was heavily overcast. Our decision became firmer as time went on. During most of these hours the two of us journeyed from the control house out into the darkness to look



18 July 1945.

at the stars and to assure each other that the one or two visible stars were becoming brighter. At 0510 I left Dr. Oppenheimer and returned to the main observation point which was 17,000 yards from the point of explosion. In accordance with our orders I found all personnel not otherwise occupied massed on a bit of high ground.

At about two minutes of the scheduled firing time all persons lay face down with their feet pointing towards the explosion. As the remaining time was called from the loud speaker from the 10,000 yard control station there was complete silence. Dr. Conant said he had never imagined seconds could be so long. Most of the individuals in accordance with orders shielded their eyes in one way or another. There was then this burst of light of a brilliance beyond any comparison. We all rolled over and looked through dark glasses at the ball of fire. About forty seconds later came the shock wave followed by the sound, neither of which seemed startling after our complete astonishment at the extraordinary lighting intensity. Dr. Conant reached over and we shook hands in mutual congratulations. Dr. Bush, who was on the other side of me, did likewise. The feeling of the entire assembly was similar to that described by General Farrell, with even the uninitiated feeling profound awe. Drs. Conant and Bush and myself were struck by an even stronger feeling that the faith of those who had been responsible for the initiation and the carrying on of this Herculean project had been justified. I personally thought of Blondin crossing Niagara Falls on his tight rope, only to see this tight rope had lasted for almost

18 July 1945.

three years and of my repeated confident-appearing assurances that such a thing was possible and that we would do it.

13. A large group of observers were stationed at a point about 27 miles north of the point of explosion. Attached is a memorandum written shortly after the explosion by Mr. E. O. Lawrence which may be of interest. ✓

XI * 14. While General Farrell was waiting about midnight for a commercial airplane to Washington at Albuquerque—120 miles away from the site—he overheard several airport employees discussing their reaction to the blast. One said that he was out on the parking apron; it was quite dark; then the whole southern sky was lighted as though by a bright sun; the light lasted several seconds. Another remarked that if a few exploding bombs could have such an effect, it must be terrible to have them drop on a city.

X 15. My liaison officer at the Alamogordo Air Base, 60 miles away, made the following report: L

"There was a blinding flash of light that lighted the entire northwestern sky. In the center of the flash, there appeared to be a huge billow of smoke. The original flash lasted approximately 10 to 15 seconds. As the first flash died down, there arose in the approximate center of where the original flash had occurred an enormous ball of what appeared to be fire and closely resembled a rising sun that was three-fourths above a mountain. The ball of fire lasted approximately 15 seconds, then died down and the sky resumed an almost normal appearance.

18 July 1945.

"Almost immediately, a third, but much smaller, flash and billow of smoke of a whiteish-orange color appeared in the sky, again lighting the sky for approximately 4 seconds. At the time of the original flash, the field was lighted well enough so that a newspaper could easily have been read. The second and third flashes were of much lesser intensity.

"We were in a glass-enclosed control tower some 70 feet above the ground and felt no concussion or air compression. There was no noticeable earth tremor although reports overheard at the Field during the following 24 hours indicated that some believed that they had both heard the explosion and felt some earth tremor."


16. I have not written a separate report for General Marshall as I feel you will want to show this to him. I have informed the necessary people here of our results. Lord Halifax after discussion with Mr. Harrison and myself stated that he was not sending a full report to his government at this time. I informed him that I was sending this to you and that you might wish to show it to the proper British representatives.

17. We are all fully conscious that our real goal is still before us. The battle test is what counts in the war with Japan.

18. May I express my deep personal appreciation for your congratulatory cable to us and for the support and confidence which I have received from you ever since I have had this work under my charge.

18 July 1945.

19. I know that Colonel Ayle will guard these papers with his customary extraordinary care.


L. R. GROVES,
Major General, USA.

4 Inclosures:
Sketch
Picture
News Release
Statement by I. O. Lawrence

JULY 16, 1945

CLOUD
DRAWINGS

First atomic
bomb
explosion
along with H.A.
Sketches from
3-29 flying at
30,000 ft., about
15 miles away.

170° course average

0 = 5:30 AM

Looking toward 80°

5:38 AM



about 24,000 ft.

undercast.



dark brown

light gray

see through here

light gray

undercast

150°
Looking toward 60°
5:42 AM



HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of
LANSING LAMONT



July 17, '45

Just spent a couple of hours with Stalin. Joe Davies called on Gushki and made the date for tonight for noon today. Promptly a few minutes before twelve I looked up from the desk and there stood Stalin in the doorway. I got to my feet and advanced to meet him. He put out his hand and smiled. I did the same we shook. I greeted Molotov and the interpreter and we sat down. After the usual polite remarks we got down to business. I told Stalin that I am no diplomat but usually said yes or no to questions after hearing all the arguments. It pleased him. I asked him if he had the agenda for the meeting. He said he had and that he had some more questions to present. I told him to fire away. He did and it is dynamite - but I have some dynamite too which does not explode now. He wants to fire Franco to which I wouldn't object and divide up the Italian colonies and other mandates, some no doubt that the British have. Then he got on the Chinese situation, or told us what agreements had been reached and what was in abeyance. Most of the big points are settled. He'll be in the Jap War on August 15th. Five Japs after that comes out. We had lunch talked briefly, put on a real show drinking toasts to everyone then had pictures made in the back yard. I can deal with Stalin. He is honest - but smart as hell.

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files



July 18, 45

A breakfast with nephew Harry, a sergeant in the Field Artillery. He is a good soldier and a nice boy. They took him off Queen Elizabeth at Queens and flew him here, sending him home Friday. Went to lunch with P.M. at 1:30 walked around to British House. Met at the gate by Mr. Churchill. Guard of honor drawn up. Fine body of men Scottish Guards. Band played Stay Panged Banner. Inspected Guard and went in for lunch. P.M. & I ate alone. Translated Manhattan (it is a success). Decided to tell Stalin about it. Stalin had told P.M. of telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace. Stalin also read his answer to me. It was satisfactory. Believe Japs will fold up before Russia comes in.

I am sure they will when Manhattan appears over their homeland. I shall inform Stalin about it at an appropriate time. Stalin's breakfast was a most satisfactory meeting. I invited him to come to the U.S. Told him I'd send the Battleship Wisconsin for him if he'd come. He said he wanted to cooperate with U.S. in peace as we had cooperated in War but it would be harder. Said he was grossly misunderstood in U.S. and I was misunderstood in Russia. I told him that we each could help to remedy that situation in our home countries and that I intended to try with all I had to do my part at home. He gave me a most cordial smile and said he would do as much in Russia.

Walter went to the conference and it was

my job to present the Minister proposed agenda. There were three proposals and I began them though in short order, much to the surprise of Mr. Churchill. Stalin was very much pleased. Churchill was too after he had recovered. I'm not going to stay around this terrible place all Sunday just to listen to speeches. I'll go home to the Senate for that.



July 25 1945

We met at 11 A.M. today. That is Stahia, Churchill and the U.S. President. But I had a most important session with Lord Mountbatten & General Marshall before that. We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world. It may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark.

Anyway we think we have found the way to cause a disintegration of the atom. An experiment in the New Mexican desert was startling - to put it mildly. Thirteen pounds of the explosive caused the complete disintegration of a steel tower 60 feet high, created a crater 6 feet deep and 1200 feet in diameter, knocked over a steel tower 1/2 mile away and knocked men down 10,000 yards away. The explosion was visible for more than 200 miles and audible for 40 miles and more.

This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. Those told the Sec. of War Mr. Stimson to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old Capital or the new.

He & I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and we will issue a warning. ^{State} I meant asking the Japs to surrender and cease hostilities. I'm sure they will not do that but we will have given them the chance. It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler's crowd or Stalin's did not discover this atomic bomb. It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful.

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

62-769

This is the place I
told Stalin about the
Atom Bomb, which was
exploded July 16, 1945
in New Mexico. He did
not realize what I was
talking about!

HSY


PATENT PENDING DATE ASSIGNMENT 62-769 INSERT FILM EMULSION SIDE DOWN FILE NO.



CONFERENCE OF BIG THREE POWERS AT POTSDAM
NEAR BERLIN, AUGUST 5-7 JULY THRU 2 AUGUST
1945 TO DEMAND THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN
Generalissimo Josef Stalin, facing camera,
shakes hands with Secretary of State James
F. Byrnes near the conference table just
before the opening of the third day's
session, 7/29/45

63-1456-464

In which I tell Stalin
we expect to drop the most
powerful explosive ever made on
the Japanese. He smiled and said
he appreciated my telling him—
but he did not know what I was
talking about—the Atomic Bomb!
H.S.T.



U S FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING ~~SECRET~~ MESSAGE

U R G E N T

FROM: AGMAR Washington

TO : Tripartite Conference Bahlsberg, Germany

NO : WAR 41031

30 July 1945.

To the President from the Secretary of War.

The time schedule on Groves' project is progressing so rapidly that it is now essential that statement for release by you be available not later than Wednesday, 1 August. I have revised draft of statement, which I previously presented to you, in light of

- (A) Your recent ultimatum,
- (B) Dramatic results of test and
- (C) Certain minor suggestions made by British of which Byrnes is aware.

While I am planning to start a copy by special courier tomorrow in the hope you can be reached, nevertheless in the event he does not reach you in time, I will appreciate having your authority to have White House release revised statement as soon as necessary.

Sorry circumstances seem to require this emergency action.

ACTION: Gen. Vaughan

VICTORY-IN-733

(31 July 1945)

302217Z

50P

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652, Sec. 302 and 303 or 304

OSD Letter May 3, 1972

147-Hc. 2220 Dm 512-79

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of
GEORGE M. ELSEY

Sec War

Reply to your 41011
suggestions approved
Release when ready
but not sooner than
August 2.

HST



ORIGINAL IN SECURITY CAGE - GEORGE M. ELSEY PAPERS - HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of
GEORGE M. ELSEY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Berlin, July 31, 1945.

Dear Bess:- It was surely good to talk with you this morning at 7 A.M. It is hard to think that it is 11 P.M. yesterday where you are. The connection was not so good this morning on account of the storm over the Atlantic.

We have been going great guns the last day or two and while the Casperian was at a stand still because of Uncle Joe's indisposition, the other Mr. Rogers, Hobbs and Allen & Bessie all worked and accomplished a great deal. I rather think Mr. Stalin is still in because he is not so happy over the English elections. He does not know it

but I have an ace in the hole and another one showing - so unless he has three or two pair (and I know he has not) we are sitting all right.

The whole difficulty is reparations. Of course the Russians are naturally better and they have been thrashed by the Germans over and over again and you can hardly blame them for their attitude. The thing I have to watch is to keep our skirts clean and make no commitments.

The Poles are the other headache. They have moved into East Prussia and to the Oder in Prussia and now they are willing to go to war again - they

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of Harry S. Truman
Pertaining to Family, Business & Personal Affairs
Family Correspondence File



can stay and they will stay with
Bilshinski backing - so you see incomes
old man reputation again and a
completely German backed Poland.

Burns, Leahy and I have worked
out a program I think to get a
bad situation. We should reach a
tentative agreement in the Big Three
this afternoon and final one tomorrow
and be on the way Thursday and
surely not later than Friday.

We are leaving from Plymouth
England which gives us 48 hours start
of leaving from Antwerp. So if we
get untied from the dock Friday
afternoon by Thursday we'll be in

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
Pertaining to Family, Busi-
ness & Personal Affairs
Family Correspondence File



Norfolk and Washington the next day
 in the morning. It may be possible
 of course to be a day sooner but
 I am giving you the extreme
 limit. The last part leaves here
 today and one will leave the boat
 when we get on it. But will re-
 ceive mail right up to bedtime.

I'll sure be glad to see you and
 the White House and be where I can
 at least go to bed without being watched.

Kiss my lady. Lots of love

Harry

I've got to head with the Limy King
 when I get to Plymouth.

Part I - Psychological Warfare

1. Below is a copy of the first leaflet (AB-11) which was dropped on Japanese cities in conjunction with the Atomic Bomb.

2. A translation of the above leaflet follows:

TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE:

"America asks that you take immediate heed of what we say on this leaflet.

"We are in possession of the most destructive explosive ever devised by man. A single one of our newly developed atomic bombs is actually the equivalent in explosive power to what 2000 of our giant B-29's can carry on a single mission. This awful fact is one for you to ponder and we solemnly assure you it is grimly accurate.

"We have just begun to use this weapon against your homeland. If you still have any doubt, make inquiry as to what happened to Hiroshima when just one atomic bomb fell on that city.

"Before using this bomb to destroy every resource of the military by which they are prolonging this useless war, we ask that you now petition the Emperor to end the war. Our President has outlined for you the thirteen consequences of an honorable surrender: We urge that you accept these consequences and begin the work of building a new, better, and peace-loving Japan.

"You should take steps now to cease military resistance. Otherwise, we shall resolutely employ this bomb and all our other superior weapons to promptly and forcefully end the war."

EVACUATE YOUR CITIES

3. Below is a copy of the second leaflet (AB-12) which was dropped on Japanese cities in conjunction with the Atomic Bomb.

~~SECRET~~

DOC No. 5200.10, June 29, 1950
 Issued by SE Date 12-12-62

-60-

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

DOC Dir. 5200.10

RM By 4

Date 8-17-77

4. A translation of the above leaflet follows:

"ATTENTION JAPANESE PEOPLE"

EVACUATE YOUR CITIES

"Because your military leaders have rejected the thirteen part surrender declaration, two momentous events have occurred in the last few days.

"The Soviet Union, because of this rejection on the part of the military has notified your Ambassador Sato that it has declared war on your nation. Thus, all powerful countries of the world are now at war against you.

"Also, because of your leaders' refusal to accept the surrender declaration that would enable Japan to honorably end this useless war, we have employed our atomic bomb.

"A single one of our newly developed atomic bombs is actually the equivalent in explosive power to what 2000 of our giant B-29's could have carried on a single mission. Radio Tokyo has told you that with the first use of this weapon of total destruction, Hiroshima was virtually destroyed.

"Before we use this bomb again and again to destroy every resource of the military by which they are prolonging this useless war, petition the Emperor now to end the war. Our President has outlined for you the thirteen consequences of an honorable surrender; We urge that you accept these consequences and begin the work of building a new, better, and peace loving Japan.

"Act at once or we shall resolutely employ this bomb and all our other superior weapons to promptly and forcefully end the war."

EVACUATE YOUR CITIES

~~SECRET~~
DOD Dir. 5200.10, June 23, 1960
RMM by SE date 12-1-62 - 2

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.10
RMM By SE Date 8-17-67

-51-

~~TOP SECRET~~

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
MISCELLANEOUS HISTORICAL
DOCUMENT FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington, D. C.

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on and destroyed its usefulness to the enemy. That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of T.N.T. It had more than two thousand times the blast power of the British "Grand Slam" which is the largest bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare.

The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid many fold. And the end is not yet. With this bomb we have now added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction to supplement the growing power of our armed forces. In their present form these bombs are now in production and even more powerful forms are in development.

It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East.

Before 1939, it was the accepted belief of scientists that it was theoretically possible to release atomic energy. But no one knew any practical method of doing it. By 1942, however, we knew that the Germans were working feverishly to find a way to add atomic energy to the other engines of war with which they hoped to enslave the world. But they failed. We may be grateful to Providence that the Germans got the V-1's and V-2's late and in limited quantities and even more grateful that they did not get the atomic bomb at all.

The battle of the laboratories held fateful risks for us as well as the battles of the air, land and sea, and we have now won the battle of the laboratories as we have won the other battles.

Beginning in 1940, before Pearl Harbor, scientific knowledge useful in war was pooled between the United States and Great Britain, and many priceless helps to our victories

HARRY S TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of:
Eben A. Ayers

have come from that arrangement. Under that general policy the research on the atomic bomb was begun. With American and British scientists working together we entered the race of discovery against the Germans.

The United States had available the large number of scientists of distinction in the many needed areas of knowledge. It had the tremendous industrial and financial resources necessary for the project and they could be devoted to it without undue impairment of other vital war work. In the United States the laboratory work and the production plants, on which a substantial start had already been made, would be out of reach of enemy bombing, while at that time Britain was exposed to constant air attack and was still threatened with the possibility of invasion. For these reasons Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt agreed that it was wise to carry on the project here. We now have two great plants and many lesser works devoted to the production of atomic power. Employment during peak construction numbered 125,000 and over 65,000 individuals are even now engaged in operating the plants. Many have worked there for two and a half years. Few know what they have been producing. They see great quantities of material going in and they see nothing coming out of these plants, for the physical size of the explosive charge is exceedingly small. We have spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history -- and won.

But the greatest marvel is not the size of the enterprise, its secrecy, nor its cost, but the achievement of scientific brains in putting together infinitely complex pieces of knowledge held by many men in different fields of science into a workable plan. And hardly less marvelous has been the capacity of industry to design, and of labor to operate, the machines and methods to do things never done before so that the brain child of many minds came forth in physical shape and performed as it was supposed to do. Both science and industry worked under the direction of the United States Army, which achieved a unique success in managing so diverse a problem in the advancement of knowledge in an amazingly short time. It is doubtful if such another combination could be got together in the world. What has been done is the greatest achievement of organized science in history. It was done under high pressure and without failure.

We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories, and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan's power to make war.

It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth. Behind this air attack will follow sea and land forces in such numbers and power as they have not yet seen and with the fighting skill of which they are already well aware.

The Secretary of War, who has kept in personal touch with all phases of the project, will immediately make public a statement giving further details.

His statement will give facts concerning the sites at Oak Ridge near Knoxville, Tennessee, and at Richland near Pasco, Washington, and an installation near Santa Fe, New Mexico. Although the workers at the sites have been making materials to be used in producing the greatest destructive force in history they have not themselves been in danger beyond that of many other occupations, for the utmost care has been taken of their safety.

The fact that we can release atomic energy ushers in a new era in man's understanding of nature's forces. Atomic energy may in the future supplement the power that now comes from coal, oil, and falling water, but at present it cannot be produced on a basis to compete with them commercially. Before that comes there must be a long period of intensive research.

It has never been the habit of the scientists of this country or the policy of this Government to withhold from the world scientific knowledge. Normally, therefore, everything about the work with atomic energy would be made public.

But under present circumstances it is not intended to divulge the technical processes of production or all the military applications, pending further examination of possible methods of protecting us and the rest of the world from the danger of sudden destruction.

I shall recommend that the Congress of the United States consider promptly the establishment of an appropriate commission to control the production and use of atomic power within the United States. I shall give further consideration and make further recommendations to the Congress as to how atomic power can become a powerful and forceful influence towards the maintenance of world peace.

STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR

The recent use of the atomic bomb over Japan, which was today made known by the President, is the culmination of years of herculean effort on the part of science and industry working in cooperation with the military authorities. This development which was carried forward by the many thousand participants with the utmost energy and the very highest sense of national duty, with the greatest secrecy and the most imperative of time schedules, probably represents the greatest achievement of the combined efforts of science, industry, labor, and the military in all history.

The military weapon which has been forged from the products of this vast undertaking has an explosive force such as to stagger the imagination. Improvements will be forthcoming shortly which will increase by several fold the present effectiveness. But more important for the long-range implications of this new weapon, is the possibility that another scale of magnitude will be evolved after considerable research and development. The scientists are confident that over a period of many years atomic bombs may well be developed which will be very much more powerful than the atomic bombs now at hand. It is abundantly clear that the possession of this weapon by the United States even in its present form should prove a tremendous aid in the shortening of the war against Japan.

The requirements of security do not permit of any revelation at this time of the exact methods by which the bombs are produced or of the nature of their action. However, in accord with its policy of keeping the people of the nation as completely informed as is consistent with national security, the War Department wishes to make known at this time, at least in broad dimension, the story behind this tremendous weapon which has been developed so effectively to hasten the end of the war. Other statements will be released which will give further details concerning the scientific and production aspects of the project and will give proper recognition to the scientists, technicians, and the men of industry and labor who have made this weapon possible.

The chain of scientific discoveries which has led to the atomic bomb began at the turn of the century when radio-activity was discovered. Until 1939 work in this field was world-wide, being carried on particularly in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Denmark.

Before the lights went out over Europe and the advent of war imposed security restrictions, the fundamental scientific knowledge concerning atomic energy from which has been developed the atomic bomb now in use by the United States was widely known in many countries, both Allied and Axis. The war, however, ended the exchange of scientific

information on this subject and, with the exception of the United Kingdom and Canada, the status of work in this field in other countries is not fully known, but we are convinced that Japan will not be in a position to use an atomic bomb in this war. While it is known that Germany was working feverishly in an attempt to develop such a weapon, her complete defeat and occupation has now removed that source of danger. Thus it was evident when the war began that the development of atomic energy for war purposes would occur in the near future and it was a question of which nations would control the discovery.

A large number of American scientists were pressing forward the boundaries of scientific knowledge in this fertile new field at the time when American science was mobilized for war. Work on atomic fission was also in progress in the United Kingdom when the war began in Europe. A close connection was maintained between the British investigations and the work here, with a pooling of information on this as on other matters of scientific research of importance for military purposes. It was later agreed between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill that the project would be most quickly and effectively brought to fruition if all effort were concentrated in the United States, thus ensuring intimate collaboration and also avoiding duplication. As a consequence of this decision, a number of British scientists who had been working on this problem were transferred here in late 1943, and they have from that time participated in the development of the project in the United States.

II.

Late in 1939 the possibility of using atomic energy for military purposes was brought to the attention of President Roosevelt. He appointed a committee to survey the problem. Research which had been conducted on a small scale with Navy funds was put on a full scale basis as a result of the recommendations of various scientific committees. At the end of 1941 the decision was made to go all-out on research work, and the project was put under the direction of a group of eminent American scientists in the Office of Scientific Research and Development, with all projects in operation being placed under contract with the OSRD. Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of OSRD, reported directly to the President on major developments. Meanwhile, President Roosevelt appointed a General Policy Group, which consisted of former Vice President Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, General George C. Marshall, Dr. James B. Conant, and Dr. Bush. In June 1942 this group recommended a great expansion of the work and the transfer of the major part of the program to the War Department. These recommendations were approved by President Roosevelt and put into effect. Major General Leslie R. Groves was appointed by the Secretary of War to take complete executive charge of the program and was made directly responsible to him and the Chief of Staff. In order to secure continuing consideration to the

military aspects of the program, the President's General Policy Group appointed a Military Policy Committee consisting of Dr. Bush as Chairman with Dr. Conant as his alternate, Lt. General Wilhelm D. Styer, and Rear Admiral William R. Funnell. This Committee was charged with the responsibility of considering and planning military policy relating to the program including the development and manufacture of material, the production of atomic fission bombs, and their use as a weapon.

Although there were still numerous unsolved problems concerning the several theoretically possible methods of producing explosive material, nevertheless, in view of the tremendous pressure of time it was decided in December 1942 to proceed with the construction of large scale plants. Two of these are located at the Clinton Engineer Works in Tennessee and a third is located at the Hanford Engineer Works in the State of Washington. The decision to embark on large scale production at such an early stage was, of course, a gamble, but as is so necessary in war a calculated risk was taken and the risk paid off.

The Clinton Engineer Works is located on a Government reservation of some 59,000 acres eighteen miles west of Knoxville, Tennessee. The large size and isolated location of this site was made necessary by the need for security and for safety against possible, but then unknown, hazards. A Government-owned and operated city, named Oak Ridge, was established within the reservation to accommodate the people working on the project. They live under normal conditions in modest houses, dormitories, hutments, and trailers, and have for their use all the religious, recreational, educational, medical, and other facilities of a modern small city. The total population of Oak Ridge is approximately 78,000 and consists of construction workers and plant operators and their immediate families; others live in immediately surrounding communities.

The Hanford Engineer Works is located on a Government reservation of 430,000 acres in an isolated area fifteen miles northwest of Pasco, Washington. Here is situated a Government-owned and operated town called Richland with a population of approximately 17,000 consisting of plant operators and their immediate families. As in the case of the site in Tennessee, consideration of security and safety necessitated placing this site in an isolated area. Living conditions in Richland are similar to those in Oak Ridge.

A special laboratory dealing with the many technical problems involved in putting the components together into an effective bomb is located in an isolated area in the vicinity of Santa Fe, New Mexico. This laboratory has been planned, organized, and directed by Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. The development of the bomb itself has been largely due to his genius and the inspiration and leadership he has given to his associates.

Certain other manufacturing plants much smaller in scale are located in the United States and in Canada for essential production of

needed materials. Laboratories at the Universities of Columbia, Chicago, and California, Iowa State College, and at other schools as well as certain industrial laboratories have contributed materially in carrying on research and in developing special equipment, materials, and processes for the project. A laboratory has been established in Canada and a pilot plant for the manufacture of material is being built. This work is being carried on by the Canadian Government with assistance from, and appropriate liaison with, the United States and the United Kingdom.

While space does not permit of a complete listing of the industrial concerns which have contributed so signally to the success of the project, mention should be made of a few. The du Pont de Nemours Company designed and constructed the Hanford installations in Washington and operate them. A special subsidiary of the M. W. Kellogg Company of New York designed one of the plants at Clinton, which was constructed by the J. A. Jones Company and is operated by the Union Carbide and Carbon Company. The second plant at Clinton was designed and constructed by the Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation of Boston and is operated by the Tennessee Eastman Company. Equipment was supplied by almost all of the important firms in the United States, including Allis-Chalmers, Chrysler, General Electric, and Westinghouse. These are only a few of the literally thousands of firms, both large and small, which have contributed to the success of the program. It is hoped that one day it will be possible to reveal in greater detail the contributions made by industry to the successful development of this weapon.

Behind these concrete achievements lie the tremendous contributions of American science. No praise is too great for the unstinting efforts, brilliant achievements, and complete devotion to the national interest of the scientists of this country. Nowhere else in the world has science performed so successfully in time of war. All the men of science who have cooperated effectively with industry and the military authorities in bringing the project of fruition merit the very highest expression of gratitude from the people of the nation.

In the War Department the main responsibility for the successful prosecution of the program rests with Major General Leslie R. Groves. His record of performance in securing the effective development of this weapon for our armed forces in so short a period of time has been truly outstanding and merits the very highest commendation.

III.

From the outset extraordinary secrecy and security measures have surrounded the project. This was personally ordered by President Roosevelt and his orders have been strictly complied with. The work has been completely compartmentalized so that while many thousands of people have been associated with the program in one way or another no one has been given more information concerning it than was absolutely necessary

to his particular job. As a result only a few highly placed persons in Government and science know the entire story. It was inevitable, of course, that public curiosity would be aroused concerning so large a project and that citizens would make inquiries of Members of Congress. In such instances the Members of Congress have been most cooperative and have accepted in good faith the statement of the War Department that military security precluded any disclosure of detailed information.

In the appropriation of funds, the Congress has accepted the assurances of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff that the appropriations made were absolutely essential to national security. The War Department is confident that the Congress will agree that its faith was not a mistake. Because it has not been possible for Congress to keep a close check on the expenditure of the funds appropriated for the project which to June 30, 1945, amounted to \$1,950,000,000, key scientific phases of the work have been reviewed from time to time by eminently qualified scientists and industrial leaders in order to be certain that the expenditures were warranted by the potentialities of the program.

The press and radio of the nation, as in so many other instances, have complied wholeheartedly with the requests of the Office of Censorship that publicity on any phase of this subject be suppressed.

IV.

In order to bring the project to fruition as quickly as possible, it was decided in August 1943 to establish a Combined Policy Committee with the following membership: Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Dr. Vannevar Bush, and Dr. James B. Conant, for the United States; Field Marshal Sir John Dill and Colonel J. J. Llewellyn, for the United Kingdom;* and Mr. C. D. Howe, for Canada. The Committee is responsible for the broad direction of the project as between the countries. Interchange of information has been provided for within certain limits. In the field of scientific research and development full interchange is maintained between those working in the same sections of the field; in matters of design, construction and operation of large scale plants information is exchanged only when such exchange will hasten the completion of weapons for use in the present war. All these arrangements are subject to the approval of the Combined Policy Committee. The United States members have had as their scientific adviser Dr. Richard C. Tolman; the British members, Sir James Chadwick; and the Canadian member, Dean C. J. Mackenzie.

It was early recognized that in order to make certain that this tremendous weapon would not fall into the hands of the enemy prompt

* Colonel Llewellyn was replaced by Sir Ronald I. Campbell in December 1943 and the latter, in turn, by the Earl of Halifax. The late Field Marshal Sir John Dill was replaced by Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson early in 1945.

action should be taken to control patents in the field and to secure control over the ore which is indispensable to the process. Substantial patent control has been accomplished in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. In each country all personnel engaged in the work, both scientific and industrial, are required to assign their entire rights to any inventions in this field to their respective governments. Arrangements have been made for appropriate patent exchange in instances where inventions are made by nationals of one country working in the territory of another. Such patent rights, interests, and titles as are exchanged, however, are held in a fiduciary sense subject to settlement at a later date on mutually satisfactory terms. All patent actions taken are surrounded by all safeguards necessary for the security of the project. At the present stage of development of the science of atomic fission, uranium is the ore essential to the production of the weapon. Steps have been taken, and continue to be taken, to assure us of adequate supplies of this mineral.

V.

Atomic fission holds great promise for sweeping developments by which our civilization may be enriched when peace comes, but the overriding necessities of war have precluded the full exploration of peacetime applications of this new knowledge. With the evidence presently at hand, however, it appears inevitable that many useful contributions to the well-being of mankind will ultimately flow from these discoveries when the world situation makes it possible for science and industry to concentrate on these aspects.

The fact that atomic energy can now be released on a large scale in an atomic bomb raises the question of the prospect of using this energy for peaceful industrial purposes. Already in the course of producing one of the elements much energy is being released, not explosively but in regulated amounts. This energy, however, is in the form of heat at a temperature too low to make practicable the operation of a conventional power plant. It will be a matter of much further research and development to design machines for the conversion of atomic energy into useful power. How long this will take no one can predict but it will certainly be a period of many years. Furthermore, there are many economic considerations to be taken into account before we can say to what extent atomic energy will supplement coal, oil, and water as fundamental sources of power in industry in this or any other country. We are at the threshold of a new industrial art which will take many years and much expenditure of money to develop.

Because of the widespread knowledge and interest in this subject even before the war, there is no possibility of avoiding the risks inherent in this knowledge by any long-term policy of secrecy. Mindful of these considerations as well as the grave problems that arise concerning the control of the weapon and the implications of this science for the peace of the world, the Secretary of War, with the approval of the President,

has appointed an Interim Committee to consider these matters. Membership of the Committee is as follows: The Secretary of War, Chairman; the Honorable James F. Byrnes, now Secretary of State; the Honorable Ralph A. Bard, former Under Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State; Dr. Vannavar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development and President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington; Dr. James B. Conant, Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee and President of Harvard University; Dr. Karl T. Compton, Chief of the Office of Field Service in the Office of Scientific Research and Development and President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Mr. George L. Harrison, Special Consultant to the Secretary of War and President of the New York Life Insurance Company. Mr. Harrison is alternate Chairman of the Committee.

The Committee is charged with the responsibility of formulating recommendations to the President concerning the post-war organization that should be established to direct and control the future course of the United States in this field both with regard to the research and developmental aspects of the entire field and to its military applications. It will make recommendations with regard to the problems of both national and international control. In its consideration of these questions, the Committee has had the benefit of the views of the scientists who have participated in the project. These views have been brought to the attention of the Committee by an advisory group selected from the leading physicists of the country who have been most active on this subject. This group is composed of Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer, Dr. E. O. Lawrence, Dr. A. H. Compton, and Dr. Enrico Fermi. The Interim Committee has also consulted the representatives of those industries which have been most closely connected with the multitude of problems that have been faced in the production phases of the project. Every effort is being bent toward assuring that this weapon and the new field of science that stands behind it will be employed wisely in the interests of the security of peace-loving nations and the well-being of the world.

The White House
Washington

AUG 7 9 06 PM 1945

WUSO LG GOVT

WINDER GA AUG 7 427P

THE PRESIDENT

(PERSONAL DELIVERY) THE WHITE HOUSE

PERMIT ME TO RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST THAT WE CEASE OUR EFFORTS TO CAJOLE JAPAN INTO SURRENDERING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POTSDAM DECLARATION. LET US CARRY THE WAR TO THEM UNTIL THEY BEG US TO ACCEPT THE UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. THE FOUL ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR BROUGHT US INTO WAR AND I AM UNABLE TO SEE ANY VALID REASON WHY WE SHOULD BE SO MUCH MORE CONSIDERATE AND LENIENT IN DEALING WITH JAPAN THAN WITH GERMANY. I EARNESTLY INSIST JAPAN SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AS HARSHLY AS GERMANY AND THAT SHE

SHOULD NOT BE THE BENEFICIARY OF A SOFT PEACE. THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, INCLUDING MANY SOUND THINKERS WHO HAVE INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ORIENT, DO NOT AGREE WITH MR. GREW IN HIS ATTITUDE THAT THERE IS ANY THING SACROSANCT ABOUT HIROHITO. HE SHOULD GO. WE HAVE NO OBLIGATION TO SHINTOLISM. THE COMPTENT- UOUS ANSWER OF THE JAPS TO THE POTSDAM ULTIMATUM JUSTIFIES A REVISION OF THAT DOCUMENT AND STERNER PEACE TERMS.

IF WE DO NOT HAVE AVAILABLE A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF ATOMIC BOMBS WITH WHICH TO FINISH THE JOB IMMEDIATELY, LET US CARRY ON WITH TNT AND FIRE BOMBS UNTIL WE CAN PRODUCE THEM. 1692-A7

I ALSO HOPE THAT YOU WILL ISSUE ORDERS FORBIDDING THE OFFICERS IN COMMAND OF OUR AIR FORCES FROM WARNING JAP CITIES

THAT THEY WILL BE ATTACKED. THESE GENERALS DO NOT FLY OVER JAPAN AND THIS SHOWMANSHIP CAN ONLY RESULT IN THE UNNECESSARY LOSS OF MANY FINE BOYS IN OUR AIR FORCE AS WELL AS OUR HELPLESS PRISONERS IN THE HANDS OF THE JAPANESE, INCLUDING THE SURVIVORS OF THE MARCH OF DEATH ON BATAAN WHO ARE CERTAIN TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE CITIES THAT HAVE BEEN WARNED.

THIS WAS A TOTAL WAR AS LONG AS OUR ENEMIES HELD ALL OF THE CARDS. WHY SHOULD WE CHANGE THE RULES NOW, AFTER THE BLOOD, TREASURE AND ENTERPRISE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE GIVEN US THE UPPER HAND. OUR PEOPLE HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN THAT THE JAPANESE STRUCK US THE FIRST BLOW IN THIS WAR WITHOUT THE SLIGHTEST WARNING. THEY BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO STRIKE THE JAPANESE UNTIL THEY

ARE BROUGHT GROVELING TO THEIR KNEES. WE SHOULD CEASE OUR APPEALS
TO JAPAN TO SUE FOR PEACE. THE NEXT PLEA FOR PEACE SHOULD COME
FROM AN UTTERLY DESTROYED TOKYO. WELCOME BACK HOME. WITH ASSURAN-
CES OF ESTEEM

RICHARD B RUSSELL US SENATOR.

THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT
IS IN THE SECURITY FILE OF
THE HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY



197

Miss

August 9, 1945

Dear Dick:

I read your telegram of August seventh with a lot of interest.

I know that Japan is a terribly cruel and uncivilized nation in warfare but I can't bring myself to believe that, because they are beasts, we should ourselves act in the same manner.

For myself, I certainly regret the necessity of wiping out whole populations because of the "pigheadedness" of the leaders of a nation and, for your information, I am not going to do it unless it is absolutely necessary. It is my opinion that after the Russians enter into war the Japanese will very shortly fold up.

My object is to save as many American lives as possible but I also have a humane feeling for the women and children in Japan.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Honorable Richard B. Russell *x PP71072*
Winder *x Jan*
Georgia

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. T.
Official File

AUG 9 11 22 AM 1945

WUX NEWYORK NY AUG 9 1945 1046A

HONORABLE HARRY S TRUMAN


PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES THE WHITE HOUSE

MANY CHRISTIANS DEEPLY DISTURBED OVER USE OF ATOMIC BOMBS
AGAINST JAPANESE CITIES BECAUSE OF THEIR NECESSARILY
INDISCRIMINATE DESTRUCTIVE EFFORTS AND BECAUSE THEIR USE SETS
EXTREMELY DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE OF MANKIND. BISHOP
OKINAWA PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AND JOHN FOSTER DULLES CHAIRMAN
OF ITS COMMISSION ON A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE ARE PREPARING
STATEMENT FOR PROBABLE RELEASE TOMORROW URGING THAT ATOMIC
BOMBS BE REGARDED AS TRUST FOR HUMANITY AND THAT JAPANESE



NATION BE GIVEN GENUINE OPPORTUNITY AND TIME TO VERIFY FACTS
ABOUT NEW BOMB AND TO ACCEPT SURRENDER TERMS. RESPECTFULLY
URGE THAT AMPLE OPPORTUNITY BE GIVEN JAPAN TO RECONSIDER
ULTIMATUM BEFORE ANY FURTHER DEVASTATION BY ATOMIC BOMB IS
VISITED UPON HER PEOPLE

FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA
SAMUEL MCCREA CAVERT GENERAL SECRETARY.



692-A

August 11, 1945

My dear Mr. Cavert:

I appreciated very much your telegram of August ninth.

Nobody is more disturbed over the use of Atomic bombs than I am but I was greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and their murder of our prisoners of war. The only language they seem to understand is the one we have been using to bombard them.

When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast. It is most regrettable but nevertheless true.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Mr. Samuel McCrea Cavert
General Secretary
Federal Council of
The Churches of Christ in America
New York City, New York

x692-A-Misc.

x PP7 185
x 197-Misc
x 400 Hawaii
Pearl Harbor
x 190-2

x 197

x PP7 33
x 213



HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
Official File

OFFICE
SECRETARY WHITE HOUSE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON
September 6, 1945
1945 SEP 10 PM 12 14


PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: HON. JAMES BYRNES,
Secretary of State.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I enclose herewith correspondence addressed to me by Mr. Leo Szilard of the Metallurgical Laboratory, Chicago, Illinois. I believe you are familiar with these papers. I will appreciate it very much if you will be good enough to write him direct, stating that his correspondence had been brought to your attention by this office.

Thank you.


MATTHEW J. CONNELLEY
Secretary to the President.

FILES OF HARRY S. TRUMAN
NOT PART OF THE WHITE
HOUSE FILES 1945-1953

ORIGINAL IN SECURITY CAGE
HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
MISCELLANEOUS HISTORICAL
DOCUMENT FILE

Metallurgical Laboratory

P.O. BOX 5207
CHICAGO 90, ILLINOIS

BUTTERFIELD 1300

August 17, 1945

Mr. Matthew J. Connelly
The White House
Washington, D. C.

944

Dear Mr. Connelly:

When Mr. Bartky and I called on you on May 25, you were kind enough to arrange an interview with Mr. Byrnes. H. C. Urey of Columbia University, Walter Bartky of the University of Chicago, and I saw Byrnes on May 28 and submitted to him a memorandum dated Spring, 1945 which was originally prepared for Mr. Roosevelt and which you have read. We are very grateful to you for the opportunity to present our views to Mr. Byrnes.

The enclosed envelope contains Mr. Einstein's letter, returned by Mr. Byrnes for transmittal to your office, and a copy of the memorandum which we left with Mr. Byrnes. You had previously seen both of these documents and they are merely transmitted for your files.

Enclosed also is the text of a petition which was signed by 67 scientists working in this Laboratory. It may not have crossed your desk since it had been transmitted in July via the War Department. Some of those who signed this petition have asked me that its text be now made public; and I wondered whether you would be good enough to let me know by August 24 if you considered its publication undesirable.



Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

Leo Szilard

ARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
MISCELLANEOUS HISTORICAL
DOCUMENT FILE

112 Mercer Street
Princeton, New Jersey
March 25, 1945

The Honorable Franklin Delano Roosevelt
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.



Sir:

I am writing you to introduce Dr. L. Szilard who proposes to submit to you certain considerations and recommendations. Unusual circumstances which I shall describe further below induce me to take this action in spite of the fact that I do not know the substance of the considerations and recommendations which Dr. Szilard proposes to submit to you.

In the summer of 1939 Dr. Szilard put before me his views concerning the potential importance of uranium for national defense. He was greatly disturbed by the potentialities involved and anxious that the United States Government be advised of them as soon as possible. Dr. Szilard, who is one of the discoverers of the neutron emission of uranium on which all present work on uranium is based, described to me a specific system which he devised and which he thought would make it possible to set up a chain reaction in un-separated uranium in the immediate future. Having known him for over twenty years both from his scientific work and personally, I have much confidence in his judgment and it was on the basis of his judgment as well as my own that I took the liberty to approach you in connection with this subject. You responded to my letter dated August 2, 1939 by the appointment of a committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Briggs and thus started the Government's activity in this field.

The terms of secrecy under which Dr. Szilard is working at present do not permit him to give me information about his work; however, I understand that he now is greatly concerned about the lack of adequate contact between scientists who are doing this work and those members of your Cabinet who are responsible for formulating policy. In the circumstances I consider it my duty to give Dr. Szilard this introduction and I wish to express the hope that you will be able to give his presentation of the case your personal attention.

Very truly yours,

A. Einstein

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
MISCELLANEOUS HISTORICAL
DOCUMENT FILE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

EO 1.1655, Sec. 2(E) and 3(E) or (D)

OSD letter, May 6, 1978

by ~~SECRET~~ 1066, NARS, Date: 12-25

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

September 11, 1945.



Atomic Bomb
File
HST

Dear Mr. President:

In handing you today my memorandum about our relations with Russia in respect to the atomic bomb, I am not unmindful of the fact that when in Potsdam I talked with you about the question whether we could be safe in sharing the atomic bomb with Russia while she was still a police state and before she put into effect provisions assuring personal rights of liberty to the individual citizen.

I still recognize the difficulty and am still convinced of the importance of the ultimate importance of a change in Russian attitude toward individual liberty but I have come to the conclusion that it would not be possible to use our possession of the atomic bomb as a direct lever to produce the change. I have become convinced that any demand by us for an internal change in Russia as a condition of sharing in the atomic weapon would be so resented that it would make the objective we have in view less probable.

I believe that the change in attitude toward the individual in Russia will come slowly and gradually and I am satisfied that we should not delay our approach to Russia in the matter of the atomic bomb until that process has been completed. My reasons

~~SECRET~~

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

~~SECRET~~

-2-

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 5(c) or 23
OSD Ref. ~~100-1-1~~
Special Inter. DATE ~~100-1-1~~



are set forth in the memorandum I am handing you today. Furthermore, I believe that this long process of change in Russia is more likely to be expedited by the closer relationship in the matter of the atomic bomb which I suggest and the trust and confidence that I believe would be inspired by the method of approach which I have outlined.

Faithfully yours,

Harry L. Stinson

Secretary of War.

The President.

The White House.

~~SECRET~~

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(a) and 3(d) or (2)
CSD letter, May 2, 1972
By SP-1 KARS Date 2-2-72

11 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Proposed Action for Control of Atomic Bombs

The advent of the atomic bomb has stimulated great military and probably even greater political interest throughout the civilized world. In a world atmosphere already extremely sensitive to power, the introduction of this weapon has profoundly affected political considerations in all sections of the globe.

In many quarters it has been interpreted as a substantial offset to the growth of Russian influence on the continent. We can be certain that the Soviet government has sensed this tendency and the temptation will be strong for the Soviet political and military leaders to acquire this weapon in the shortest possible time. Britain in effect already has the status of a partner with us in the development of this weapon. Accordingly, unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited into the partnership upon a basis of cooperation and trust, we are going to maintain the Anglo-Saxon bloc over against the Soviet in the possession of this weapon. Such a condition will almost certainly stimulate feverish activity on the part of the Soviet toward the development of this bomb in what will in effect be a secret armament race of a rather desperate character. There is evidence to indicate that such activity may have already commenced.

~~TOP SECRET~~

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(e) and 5(D) of (C)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
Prd 24/7/72, RABIS Date 2/2/75



If we feel, as I assume we must, that civilization demands that some day we shall arrive at a satisfactory international arrangement respecting the control of this new force, the question then is how long we can afford to enjoy our momentary superiority in the hope of achieving our immediate peace council objectives.

Whether Russia gets control of the necessary secrets of production in a minimum of say four years or a maximum of twenty years is not nearly as important to the world and civilization as to make sure that when they do get it they are willing and cooperative partners among the peace loving nations of the world. It is true that if we approach them now, as I would propose, we may be gambling on their good faith and risk their getting into production of bombs a little sooner than they would otherwise.

To put the matter concisely, I consider the problem of our satisfactory relations with Russia as not merely connected with but as virtually dominated by the problem of the atomic bomb. Except for the problem of the control of that bomb, those relations, while vitally important, might not be immediately pressing. The establishment of relations of mutual confidence between her and us could afford to await the slow progress of time. But with the discovery of the bomb, they become immediately emergent. Those relations may be perhaps irretrievably embittered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. For if we fail to approach them

~~TOP SECRET~~

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

~~TOP SECRET~~

RECEIVED

EO 1.1901, Sec. 301 and 501 of 10

DATE 4-22-78

2-27-78

now and merely continue to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and their distrust of our purposes and motives will increase. It will inspire them to greater efforts in an all out effort to solve the problem. If the solution is achieved in that spirit, it is much less likely that we will ever get the kind of covenant we may desperately need in the future. This risk is, I believe, greater than the other, inasmuch as our objective must be to get the best kind of international bargain we can -- one that has some chance of being kept and saving civilization not for five or for twenty years, but forever.

The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that the only way you can make a man trustworthy is to trust him; and the surest way to make him untrustworthy is to distrust him and show your distrust.

If the atomic bomb were merely another though more devastating military weapon to be assimilated into our pattern of international relations, it would be one thing. We could then follow the old custom of secrecy and nationalistic military superiority relying on international caution to prescribe the future use of the weapon as we did with gas. But I think the bomb instead constitutes merely a first step in a new control by man over the forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to fit into the old concepts. I think it really caps the climax of the race between man's growing technical

~~TOP SECRET~~

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.1 and 1.2 (S) or (TS)
CCH: [unclear]
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear]



power for destructiveness and his psychological power of self-control and group control -- his moral power. If so, our method of approach to the Russians is a question of the most vital importance in the evolution of human progress.

Since the crux of the problem is Russia, any contemplated action leading to the control of this weapon should be primarily directed to Russia. It is my judgment that the Soviet would be more apt to respond sincerely to a direct and forthright approach made by the United States on this subject than would be the case if the approach were made as a part of a general international scheme, or if the approach were made after a succession of express or implied threats or near threats in our peace negotiations.

My idea of an approach to the Soviets would be a direct proposal after discussion with the British that we would be prepared in effect to enter an arrangement with the Russians, the general purpose of which would be to control and limit the use of the atomic bomb as an instrument of war and so far as possible to direct and encourage the development of atomic power for peaceful and humanitarian purposes. Such an approach might more specifically lead to the proposal that we would stop work on the further improvement in, or manufacture of, the bomb as a military weapon, provided the Russians and the British would agree to do likewise. It might also provide that we would be willing to impound what bombs we now

~~TOP SECRET~~

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 302 and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1992

By AF/ISA, NAME Date 2-11-92



have in the United States provided the Russians and the British would agree with us that in no event will they or we use a bomb as an instrument of war unless all three Governments agree to that use. We might also consider including in the arrangement a covenant with the U. K. and the Soviets providing for the exchange of benefits of future developments whereby atomic energy may be applied on a mutually satisfactory basis for commercial or humanitarian purposes.

I would make such an approach just as soon as our immediate political considerations make it appropriate.

I emphasize perhaps beyond all other considerations the importance of taking this action with Russia as a proposal of the United States - backed by Great Britain - but peculiarly the proposal of the United States. Action of any international group of nations, including many small nations who have not demonstrated their potential power or responsibility in this war would not, in my opinion, be taken seriously by the Soviets. The loose debates which would surround such proposal, if put before a conference of nations, would provoke but scant favor from the Soviet. As I say, I think this is the most important point in the program.

After the nations which have won this war have agreed to it, there will be ample time to introduce France and China into the covenants and finally to incorporate the agreement into the scheme of the United Nations. The use of this bomb has been accepted by

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(a) and 5(D) or (E)
CDD 10/10/84
By NLT/KML NALS Date 2/12/20

the world as the result of the initiative and productive capacity of the United States, and I think this factor is a most potent lever toward having our proposals accepted by the Soviets, whereas I am most skeptical of obtaining any tangible results by way of any international debate. I urge this method as the most realistic means of accomplishing this vitally important step in the history of the world.

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War.



~~TOP SECRET~~

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

20 June 1946

My dear Mr President:

Within the next fortnight the Survey will submit to you a summary report on the study of air power in the Pacific war requested by your letter of 15 August 1945.

The Survey is submitting herewith a separate and more detailed report on the effects of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the next few days this will be followed by a separate report on the events which led to the Japanese surrender.

The report on the atomic bombings has been coordinated with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and approved by them in all respects. It has also been cleared by the Manhattan District for security.

In view of these clearances with respect to policies and security, it is suggested that should the report meet with your approval it would be appropriate for your release to the public in accordance with the views you expressed in our last conversation.

Respectfully submitted

Franklin D'Olier

Franklin D'Olier
Chairman

The President
The White House
Washington D C

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's File

the war continued many more weeks, whether sanctioned by the censors or spread by the ever-active rumor channels so common in the country.

It is apparent that the effect of the atomic bombings on the confidence of the Japanese civilian population was remarkably localized. Outside of the target cities, it was subordinate to other demoralizing experiences. The effect which it did have was probably due largely to the number of casualties and the nature of the injuries received. These consequences were in part the result of surprise and the vulnerability of the raid defense system. Properly enforced warnings, precautions, and an emergency care organization of the scale of the bomb's effects might have reduced casualties and, therefore, the effects on morale.

Even in the target cities, it must be emphasized, the atomic bombs did not uniformly destroy the Japanese fighting spirit. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when compared with other Japanese cities, were not more defeatist than the average. The bombs were tremendous personal catastrophes to the survivors, but neither time nor understanding of the revolutionary threat of the atomic bomb permitted them to see in these personal catastrophes a final blow to Japan's prospects for victory or negotiated peace.

3. The Japanese Decision to Surrender.

The further question of the effects of the bombs on the morale of the Japanese leaders and their decision to abandon the war is tied up with other factors. The atomic bomb had more effect on the thinking of government leaders than on the morale of the rank and file of civilians outside of the target areas. It cannot be said, however, that the atomic bomb convinced the leaders who effected the peace of the necessity of surrender. The decision to seek ways and means to terminate the war, influenced in part by knowledge of the low state of popular morale, had been taken in May, 1945 by the Supreme War Guidance Council.

As early as the spring of 1944 a group of former prime ministers and others close to the Emperor had been making efforts toward bringing the war to an end. This group, including such men as Admiral Okada, Admiral Yonai, Prince Konoye, and Marquis Kido, had been influential in effecting Tojo's resignation and in making Admiral Suzuki Prime Minister after Koiso's fall. Even in the Suzuki Cabinet, however, agreement was far from unanimous. The Navy Minister, Admiral Yonai, was sympathetic, but the War Minister, General Anami, usually represented the fight-to-the-end policy of the Army. In the Supreme War Guidance Council, a sort of inner cabinet, his adherence to that line was further assured by the participation of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff, so that on the peace issue this organization was evenly divided, with these three opposing the Prime



Minister, Foreign Minister, and Navy Minister. At any time military (especially Army) dissatisfaction with the Cabinet might have eventuated at least in its fall and possibly in the "liquidation" of the anti-war members.

Thus the problem facing the peace leaders in the government was to bring about a surrender despite the hesitation of the War Minister and the opposition of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff. This had to be done, moreover, without precipitating counter measures by the Army which would eliminate the entire peace group. This was done ultimately by bringing the Emperor actively into the decision to accept the Potsdam terms. So long as the Emperor openly supported such a policy and could be presented to the country as doing so, the military, which had fostered and lived on the idea of complete obedience to the Emperor, could not effectively rebel.

A preliminary step in this direction had been taken at the Imperial Conference on 26 June. At this meeting, the Emperor, taking an active part despite his custom to the contrary, stated that he desired the development of a plan to end the war as well as one to defend the home islands. This was followed by a renewal of earlier efforts to get the Soviet Union to intercede with the United States, which were effectively answered by the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July and the Russian declaration of war on 9 August.

The atomic bombings considerably speeded up these political maneuverings within the government. This in itself was partly a morale effect, since there is ample evidence that members of the Cabinet were worried by the prospect of further atomic bombings, especially on the remains of Tokyo. The bombs did not convince the military that defense of the home islands was impossible, if their behavior in government councils is adequate testimony. It did permit the Government to say, however, that no army without the weapon could possibly resist an enemy who had it, thus saving "face" for the Army leaders and not reflecting on the competence of Japanese industrialists or the valor of the Japanese soldier. In the Supreme War Guidance Council voting remained divided, with the War Minister and the two Chiefs of Staff unwilling to accept unconditional surrender. There seems little doubt, however, that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki weakened their inclination to oppose the peace group.

The peace effort culminated in an Imperial conference held on the night of 9 August and continued into the early hours of 10 August, for which the stage was set by the atomic bomb and the Russian war declaration. At this meeting the Emperor, again breaking his customary silence, stated specifically that he wanted acceptance of the Potsdam terms.

A quip was current in high government circles at this time that the atomic bomb was the real Kanikaze, since it saved Japan from



December 16, 1946

My dear Doctor Compton:

I appreciated very much your sending me the article from The Atlantic Monthly - If The Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Used. It is the first sensible statement I have seen on the subject.

I have also asked the former Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, to assemble the facts and get them into record form and, I think, he is doing that.

Your statement in The Atlantic Monthly is a fair analysis of the situation except that the final decision had to be made by the President, and was made after a complete survey of the whole situation had been made. The conclusions reached were substantially those set out in your article.

The Japanese were given fair warning and were offered the terms, which they finally accepted, well in advance of the dropping of the bomb. I imagine the bomb caused them to accept the terms.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Dr. Karl T. Compton
President
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge 39, Massachusetts



HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files



IF THE ATOMIC BOMB HAD NOT BEEN USED

by KARL T. COMPTON

ABOUT a week after V-J Day I was one of a small group of scientists and engineers interrogating an intelligent, well-informed Japanese Army officer in Yokohama. We asked him what, in his opinion, would have been the next major move if the war had continued. He replied: "You would probably have tried to invade our homeland with a landing operation on Kyushu about November 1. I think the attack would have been made on such and such beaches."

"Could you have repelled this landing?" we asked, and he answered: "It would have been a very desperate fight, but I do not think we could have stopped you."

"What would have happened then?" we asked.

He replied: "We would have kept on fighting until all Japanese were killed, but we would not have been defeated," by which he meant that they would not have been disgraced by surrender.

It is easy now, after the event, to look back and say that Japan was already a beaten nation, and to ask what therefore was the justification for the use of the atomic bomb to kill so many thousands of helpless Japanese in this inhuman way; furthermore, should we not better have kept it to ourselves as a secret weapon for future use, if necessary? This argument has been advanced often, but it seems to me utterly fallacious.

I had, perhaps, an unusual opportunity to know the pertinent facts from several angles, yet I was without responsibility for any of the decisions. I can therefore speak without doing so defensively. While my role in the atomic bomb development was a very minor one, I was a member of the group called together by Secretary of War Stimson to assist him in plans for its test, use, and subsequent handling. Then, shortly before Hiroshima, I became attached to General MacArthur in Manila, and lived for two months with his staff. In this way

A physicist and the first of three brothers to become college presidents, KARL T. COMPTON has been the head of Massachusetts Institute of Technology since 1930. During the war he served in a number of war projects in close association with Dr. Vannevar Bush and President James B. Conant of Harvard. He was a member of the National Defense Research Committee, Chief of the Office of Field Service of the OSRD, and an observer on General MacArthur's staff directly after V-J Day.

I learned something of the invasion plans and of the sincere conviction of these best-informed officers that a desperate and costly struggle was still ahead. Finally, I spent the first month after V-J Day in Japan, where I could ascertain at first hand both the physical and the psychological state of that country. Some of the Japanese whom I consulted were my scientific and personal friends of long standing.

From this background I believe, with complete conviction, that the use of the atomic bomb saved hundreds of thousands — perhaps several millions — of lives, both American and Japanese; that without its use the war would have continued for many months; that no one of good conscience knowing, as Secretary Stimson and the Chiefs of Staff did, what was probably ahead and what the atomic bomb might accomplish could have made any different decision. Let some of the facts speak for themselves.

Was the use of the atomic bomb inhuman? All war is inhuman. Here are some comparisons of the atomic bombing with conventional bombing. At Hiroshima the atomic bomb killed about 80,000 people, pulverized about five square miles, and wrecked an additional ten square miles of the city, with decreasing damage out to seven or eight miles from the center. At Nagasaki the fatal casualties were 45,000 and the area wrecked was considerably smaller than at Hiroshima because of the configuration of the city.

Compare this with the results of two B-29 incendiary raids over Tokyo. One of these raids killed about 125,000 people, the other nearly 100,000.

Of the 210 square miles of greater Tokyo, 85 square miles of the densest part was destroyed as completely, for all practical purposes, as were the centers of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; about half the buildings were destroyed in the remaining 125 square miles; the number of people driven homeless out of Tokyo was considerably larger than the population of greater Chicago. These figures are based on information given us in Tokyo and on a detailed study of the air reconnaissance maps. They may be somewhat in error but are certainly of the right order of magnitude.

Was Japan already beaten before the atomic bomb? The answer is certainly "yes" in the sense that the fortunes of war had turned against her. The answer is "no" in the sense that she was still fighting desperately and there was every reason to believe that she would continue to do so; and this is the only answer that has any practical significance.

General MacArthur's staff anticipated about 50,000 American casualties and several times that number of Japanese casualties in the November 1 operation to establish the initial beachheads on Kyushu. After that they expected a far more costly struggle before the Japanese homeland was subdued. There was every reason to think that the Japanese would defend their homeland with even greater fanaticism than when they fought to the death on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. No American soldier who survived the bloody struggles on these islands has much sympathy with the view that battle with the Japanese was over as soon as it was clear that their ultimate situation was hopeless. No, there was every reason to expect a terrible struggle long after the point at which some people can now look back and say, "Japan was already beaten."

A month after our occupation I heard General MacArthur say that even then, if the Japanese government lost control over its people and the millions of former Japanese soldiers took to guerrilla warfare in the mountains, it could take a million American troops ten years to master the situation.

That this was not an impossibility is shown by the following fact, which I have not seen reported. We recall the long period of nearly three weeks between the Japanese offer to surrender and the actual surrender on September 2. This was needed in order to arrange details of the surrender and occupation and to permit the Japanese government to prepare its people to accept the capitulation. It is not generally realized that there was threat of a revolt against the government, led by an Army group supported by the peasants, to seize control and continue the war. For several days it was touch and go as to whether the people would follow their government in surrender.

The bulk of the Japanese people did not consider themselves beaten; in fact they believed they were winning in spite of the terrible punishment they had taken. They watched the paper balloons take off and float eastward in the wind, confident that these were carrying a terrible retribution to the United States in revenge for our air raids.

We gained a vivid insight into the state of knowledge and morale of the ordinary Japanese soldier from a young private who had served through the war in the Japanese Army. He had lived since babyhood in America, and had graduated in 1940 from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This lad, thoroughly American in outlook, had gone with his family to visit relatives shortly after his graduation. They were caught in the mobilization and he was drafted into the Army.

This young Japanese told us that all his fellow soldiers believed that Japan was winning the war. To them the losses of Iwo Jima and Okinawa were parts of a grand strategy to lure the American forces closer and closer to the homeland, until they could be pounced upon and utterly annihilated. He himself had come to have some doubts as a result of various inconsistencies in official reports. Also he had seen the Ford assembly line in operation and knew that Japan could not match America in war production. But none of the soldiers had any inkling of the true situation until one night, at ten-thirty, his regiment was called to hear the reading of the surrender proclamation.

Did the atomic bomb bring about the end of the war? That it would do so was the calculated gamble and hope of Mr. Stimson, General Marshall, and their associates. The facts are these. On July 26, 1945, the Potsdam Ultimatum called on Japan to surrender unconditionally. On July 29 Premier Suzuki issued a statement, purportedly at a cabinet press conference, scorning as unworthy of official notice the surrender ultimatum, and emphasizing the increasing rate of Japanese aircraft production. Eight days later, on August 6, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima; the second was dropped on August 9 on Nagasaki; on the following day, August 10, Japan declared its intention to surrender, and on August 14 accepted the Potsdam terms.

On the basis of these facts, I cannot believe that, without the atomic bomb, the surrender would have come without a great deal more of costly struggle and bloodshed.

Exactly what role the atomic bomb played will always allow some scope for conjecture. A survey has shown that it did not have much immediate effect on the common people far from the two bombed cities; they knew little or nothing of it. The even more disastrous conventional bombing of Tokyo and other cities had not brought the people into the mood to surrender.

The evidence points to a combination of factors. (1) Some of the more informed and intelligent elements in Japanese official circles realized that they were fighting a losing battle and that complete destruction lay ahead if the war continued. These elements, however, were not powerful enough to sway the situation against the dominating Army organization, backed by the profiteering industrialists, the peasants, and the ignorant masses. (2) The atomic bomb introduced a dramatic new element into the situation, which strengthened the hands of those who sought peace and provided a face-saving argument for those who had hitherto advocated continued war. (3) When the second atomic bomb was dropped, it became clear that this was not an isolated weapon, but that there were others to follow. With dread prospect of a deluge of these terrible bombs and no possibility of preventing them, the argument for surrender was made con-

vincing. This I believe to be the true picture of the effect of the atomic bomb in bringing the war to a sudden end, with Japan's unconditional surrender.

If the atomic bomb had not been used, evidence like that I have cited points to the practical certainty that there would have been many more months of death and destruction on an enormous scale. Also the early timing of its use was fortunate for a reason which could not have been anticipated. If the invasion plans had proceeded as scheduled, October, 1945, would have seen Okinawa covered with airplanes and its harbors crowded with landing craft poised for the attack. The typhoon which struck Okinawa in that month would have wrecked the invasion plans with a military disaster comparable to Pearl Harbor.

These are some of the facts which lead those who know them, and especially those who had to base decisions on them, to feel that there is much delusion and wishful thinking among those after-

the-event strategists who now deplore the use of the atomic bomb on the ground that its use was inhuman or that it was unnecessary because Japan was already beaten. And it was not one atomic bomb, or two, which brought surrender; it was the experience of what an atomic bomb will actually do to a community, *plus the dread of many more*, that was effective.

If 500 bombers could wreak such destruction on Tokyo, what will 500 bombers, each carrying an atomic bomb, do to the City of Tomorrow? It is this deadly prospect which now lends such force to the two basic policies of our nation on this subject: (1) We must strive generously and with all our ability to promote the United Nations' effort to assure future peace between nations; but we must not lightly surrender the atomic bomb as a means for our own defense. (2) We should surrender or share it only when there is adopted an international plan to enforce peace in which we can have great confidence.

NUREMBERG IN RETROSPECT

by CHARLES E. WYZANSKI, JR.

1

In the April *Atlantic Monthly* I raised doubts as to certain aspects of the then uncompleted Nuremberg trial. Since that time I have had a chance to profit from comments of Mr. Justice Jackson, Professor Sheldon Glueck, Professor Max Radin, Professor Lon Fuller, an anonymous contributor to the July, 1946, *Law Quarterly Review*, and other writers; I have also read reports of the trial and have studied a summary of the judgment. This further investigation has led me to resolve some of my earlier doubts, and I hope that if I state my own change of views I may contribute to the thinking of others who are concerned about the great questions raised by this trial.

The doubt which seemed to critics of the Nuremberg trial most fundamental was whether the defendants could properly be held to answer a charge that they had engaged in "the crime of aggressive war." Was there any such substantive offense?

Many who replied affirmatively contended that "the crime of aggressive war" was no different from

the specific war crimes (such as killing a captured enemy civilian) that had been defined in the Hague Convention of 1907. That is, they argued that waging an aggressive war was a crime that had been outlawed by a specific treaty or treaties; and that individuals who engaged in such conduct, like individuals who engaged in the slaughter of captured civilians, were triable by any tribunal established for the occasion by a warring power, and were punishable by any penalty prescribed for the occasion by that power.

That argument seems to me unsound. It does not seem to me that an examination of the pre-war treaties, conference proposals, diplomatic correspondence, and juristic writings shows that there was a specific international covenant that individuals who waged an aggressive war were criminals in the same sense that there was a specific international covenant that individuals who killed captured civilians were criminals.

But it is not sufficient to stop with that purely analytical approach. There remains this issue: Is it just to declare, a

planners of an aggression. First, they planned this war both

In the *Atlantic* for last April CHARLES E. WYZANSKI, JR., Judge of the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts, expressed his doubts about the validity of the Nuremberg trial. In the interval his misgivings have been cleared away for reasons as forthright as they are conscientious.

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 23, 1952

MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL LANDRY:

Attached is a letter from Professor Gato of the University of Chicago asking clarification of the precise circumstances under which the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.

If this letter is to be answered, it may take some research in official files and discussion with the President. Since this is an Air Force project, perhaps it would be more appropriate if you checked into this thing.

If, when the information is available, you wish us to write a reply, we will be glad to do so.



Irving Perimeter

IRVING PERIMETER

Attachment

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman

President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

30 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President, it would be very desirable, if you could do it, to let this historian have such information as could be used in the history that he is writing concerning the circumstances under which the first atomic bombs were dropped.



R. B. Landry
R. B. LANDRY
Major General, USAF

Incl

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CHICAGO 37 ILLINOIS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

1126 EAST 59TH STREET

December 6, 1952

The President *Truman*
Washington, D. C.



Sir:

For several years it has been my privilege to serve as one of the editors and authors of The Army Air Forces in World War II, a history published on a non-profit basis under the joint sponsorship of the U.S. Air Force and the University of Chicago. One of my tasks for the fifth volume, now in press, was to write an account of the atomic bomb attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In respect to the decision to use the bomb I have been faced with an apparent discrepancy in the evidence which I have been unable to resolve, and, in spite of a reluctance to intrude upon the time of the President, I am turning to you for information for which you are the best and perhaps the sole authority.

I have read with great interest your own statements - that released on 6 August 1945 and that contained in your letter to Dr. Karl T. Compton, dated 15 December 1946 and published in the Atlantic Monthly of February 1947. I have read also the late Mr. Stimson's more detailed account in Harper's Magazine of February 1947 which is in perfect accord with yours - the gist being that the dread decision for which you courageously assumed responsibility was made at Potsdam "in the face of" Premier Suzuki's rejection of the warning contained in the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July, and that the motive was to avoid the great loss of life that would have attended the invasion of Kyushu scheduled for November.

More recently I have seen a photostatic copy of the directive to Gen. Carl Spaatz ordering him to deliver the first atomic bomb against one of four designated targets; the document has been declassified and I am inclosing a true copy. The letter is dated at Washington on 25 July 1945 and bears the signature of Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Acting Chief of Staff during General Marshall's absence at Potsdam. According to General Arnold's statement elsewhere [H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), p. 589], this directive was based on a memorandum dispatched by courier to Washington after a conference on 22 July between himself, Secretary Stimson, and General Marshall.

The directive contains an unqualified order to launch the attack "as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945."

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY


Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

December 6, 1952

There is no reference to the Potsdam Declaration which was to be issued on the next day and no statement as to what should be done in the event of a Japanese offer to surrender before 3 August. It is possible that the written directive was qualified by oral instructions, or that it was intended that it be countermanded by a radio message if the Japanese did accept the Potsdam terms, or that the directive was an erroneous representation of Secretary Stimson's real intentions. Nevertheless, as it stands the directive seems to indicate that the decision to use the bomb had been made at least one day before the promulgation of the Potsdam Declaration and two days before Suzuki's rejection thereof on 28 July, Tokyo time. Such an interpretation is in flat contradiction to the explanation implicit in the published statements, that the final decision was made only after the Japanese refusal of the ultimatum.

Because of the extraordinary importance of this problem, I am appealing to you for more complete information as to the time and the circumstances under which you arrived at the final decision, and for permission to quote your reply in the volume of which I have spoken. Your well-known interest in history has encouraged me to seek my information at the source, as the historian should, without apology other than for having intruded on your crowded schedule with a letter made overly long by my desire to state the problem accurately.

Very truly yours,

*James L. Cate*

James L. Cate
Professor of Medieval History

JLC:jm
Inclosure

O
P
Y

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

25 July 1945

TO: General Carl Spaatz
Commanding General
United States Army Strategic Air Forces

1. The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki. To carry military and civilian scientific personnel from the War Department to observe and record the effects of the explosion of the bomb, additional aircraft will accompany the airplane carrying the bomb. The observing planes will stay several miles distant from the point of impact of the bomb.

2. Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff. Further instructions will be issued concerning targets other than those listed above.

3. Dissemination of any and all information concerning the use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States. No communiques on the subject or releases of information will be issued by Commanders in the field without specific prior authority. Any news stories will be sent to the War Department for special clearance.

4. The foregoing directive is issued to you by direction and with the approval of the Secretary of War and of the Chief of Staff, USA. It is desired that you personally deliver one copy of this directive to General MacArthur and one copy to Admiral Nimitz for their information.



/s/ Thos. T. Handy
THOS. T. HANDY
General, G.S.C.
Acting Chief of Staff

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dec. 31, 1952

My dear Professor Cate:-

Your letter of Dec. 6th 1952 has just now been delivered to me.

When the message came to Potsdam that a successful atomic explosion had taken place in New Mexico, there was much excitement and consternation about the effect on the war then in progress with Japan.

The next day I told Prime Minister ~~Winston Churchill~~ ^{in Great Britain} and Generalissimo Stalin that the explosion had been a success. The British Prime Minister understood and appreciated what I'd told him. Prime Minister Stalin smiled and thanked me.

THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT
IS IN THE SECURITY FILE OF
THE HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

for reporting the explosion to him but I'm sure he did not understand its significance.

I called a meeting of the Sec. of State, Mr. Byrnes, the Sec of War, Mr. Stimson, Adm. Leahy, Gen. Marshall, Gen Eisenhower, the Sec of the Navy, Adm King and some others to discuss what should be done with this awful weapon.

I asked Gen. Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokio plane and other places in Japan. [It was his opinion that 14 million casualties would be the minimum cost as well as an equal number of the enemy.]

THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT
IS IN THE SECURITY FILE OF
THE HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

the other military and naval
men present agreed.

I asked Sec. Stimson which
cities in Japan were devoted
exclusively to war production.
He promptly named Hiroshima
and Nagasaki.

We sent an ultimatum to
Japan. It was ignored.

I ordered atomic bombs dropped
on the two cities named on
the back from Potsdam when
we were in the middle of the
Atlantic Ocean.

Dropping the bombs ended
the war, saved lives and gave

THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT
IS IN THE SECURITY FILE OF
THE HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

the free nations a chance
to face the facts.

When it looked as if Japan
would quit, Russia hurried
into the fray ^{less than a week} nine days before the
surrender so as to be in at
the settlement. No military
contribution was made by
the Russians toward victory
over Japan. Prisoners were
surrendered and Manchuria
occupied as was Korea north
of the 38th parallel.

[Russia in Asia has been
a great liability since]

THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT
IS IN THE SECURITY FILE OF
THE HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 2, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LLOYD:

There are two points in the President's draft which should be changed. On page 2, it is stated: "I asked Gen. Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokio plans and other places in Japan. It was his opinion that $\frac{1}{2}$ million casualties would be the minimum cost as well as an equal number of the enemy." Stimson says in his book On Active Service, p. 619: "We estimated that if we should be forced to carry this plan to its conclusion, the major fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946, at the earliest. I was informed that such operations might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to American forces alone." I think it is important that the President's casualty figure be changed to conform with that of Secretary Stimson, because presumably Stimson got his from Gen. Marshall; the size of the figure is very important.

On page 4, it is stated: "When it looked as if Japan would quit, Russia hurried into the fray nine days before the surrender so as to be in at the settlement." Actually, Russia announced her decision to enter the Japanese War on August 8, effective August 9; the surrender of Japan was tendered on August 14. Therefore, the statement should be amended to read "five days before the surrender" or "less than a week before the surrender."

In his letter to the President, Professor Cate calls attention to the directive of July 25, 1945 from Gen. Handy to Gen. Spaatz, containing an unqualified order to launch the atomic bomb attack. Professor Cate asks whether this directive does not contradict published statements that the final decision was made only after the Japanese refusal of the ultimatum.

According to Dr. Rudolph Winnacker, Historian of the Office of Secretary of Defense, it is clear that the Gen. Handy order could have been countermanded in the event Japan had responded to the Potsdam ultimatum — just as any military order can be countermanded. The fundamental decision to use the bomb preceded the Gen. Handy letter, and the decision to "trigger" its use and define the targets was made by the President as indicated in his memorandum. I do not feel this needs elaboration.



K. W. H.
KENNETH W. HECHLER

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LLOYD:

Dr. Winnacker called regarding the dropping of the atomic bombs, and said that all his records show are that General Groves reported on the effectiveness of the bomb test in New Mexico, reporting on July 21, and Secretary Stimson and others at Potsdam conferred daily with the President on July 22, July 23, and July 24. Presumably Secretary of the Navy Forrestal was not present at the conference to which the President refers inasmuch as he did not arrive at Potsdam until July 28 at 5:00 P. M. The only other information which Dr. Winnacker has is that the operation, initially scheduled for August 3, was postponed on two occasions (presumably due to weather).

Dr. Winnacker says that Admiral Dennison has all of the Potsdam papers, which Winnacker believes it will be necessary for us to look at in order to get a conclusive answer to the questions raised by the President's note.

Roberta Barrows says that the President left Washington for Potsdam on July 6 at 11:00 P. M., arrived on July 15, departed on the return trip on August 2 at 8:00 P. M., and arrived in Washington, D. C., on August 8 at 10:50 P. M. The Potsdam Conference actually lasted during the days July 17 to August 2, 1945.



K. W. H.
KENNETH W. HECHLER

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LLOYD:

Supplementing my previous note on the conversation with Dr. Winnacker, Gordon Arneson of the Department of State (an adviser on atomic energy) states that the order from General Handy to General Spaatz was necessary because orders had to be cut in advance and the wheels had to be set in motion, even though the final decision on dropping the bomb was necessarily in the hands of the President.

Arneson does not have a full list of the participants in the meeting at Potsdam, but he feels that Harvey Bundy, special assistant to Secretary Stimson on atomic matters, was present. Winnacker feels that McCloy may have been present, but he has no way of checking.

Arneson is sure that the President made the decision to drop the bomb at the last minute, on the way back from Potsdam.

He has no information on the selection or elimination of targets at the Potsdam meeting other than what Stimson says in his book about the elimination of Kyoto.

Bundy may have some information on this according to Arneson; Bundy is now with the law firm of Chote, Hall and Stewart in Boston.



Kenneth W. Hechler
KENNETH W. HECHLER

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

At your request I have reviewed your draft letter to Professor Cate, and I have made a few slight revisions after checking the details.

In your draft, you state that General Marshall told you that a landing in Japan would cost a quarter of a million casualties to the United States, and an equal number of the enemy. Mr. Stimson, in his book written by McGeorge Bundy, says that Marshall's estimate was over a million casualties. Your recollection sounds more reasonable than Stimson's, but in order to avoid a conflict, I have changed the wording to read that General Marshall expected a minimum of a quarter of a million casualties and possibly a much greater number -- as much as a million.

Secretary Forrestal does not appear to have been at the Potsdam meetings until July 28, and your conferences about the atom bomb appear to have taken place early in the meeting, on July 22, 23 and 24. Accordingly, I have deleted the Secretary of the Navy from the list of those with whom you conferred.

I have also inserted a paragraph explaining why the orders to General Spaatz were dated July 25 rather than after the ultimatum. This has been checked with the historian of the Department of Defense.

Russian entry into the war was less than a week before the surrender.

I have deleted the last sentence of your draft, since I think that it might be unfairly used by the propagandists of the political opposition. It states a fundamental truth, but in a very restrained way, and it seemed to me that it might raise more problems than it would help.

I attach various memoranda to me on this subject from Kenneth Hechler who did the research.



David D. Lloyd
DAVID D. LLOYD

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1953

Handwritten:
H. S. Truman
Secretary

My dear Professor Gates:

Your letter of December 6, 1952 has just now been delivered to me.

When the message came to Potsdam that a successful atomic explosion had taken place in New Mexico, there was much excitement and conversation about the effect on the war then in progress with Japan.

The next day I told the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Generalissimo Stalin that the explosion had been a success. The British Prime Minister understood and appreciated what I'd told him. Premier Stalin smiled and thanked me for reporting the explosion to him, but I'm sure he did not understand its significance.

I called a meeting of the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, General Eisenhower, Admiral King and some others, to discuss what should be done with this awful weapon.

I asked General Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokio plain and other places in Japan. It was his opinion that such an invasion would cost at a minimum one quarter of a million casualties, and might cost as much as a million, on the American side alone, with an equal number of the enemy. The other military and naval men present agreed.

I asked Secretary Stimson which cities in Japan were devoted exclusively to war production. He promptly named Hiroshima and Nagasaki, among others.

We sent an ultimatum to Japan. It was rejected.

I ordered atomic bombs dropped on the two cities named on the way back from Potsdam, when we were in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.

In your letter, you raise the fact that the directive



HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files

to General Spaatz to prepare for delivering the bomb is dated July twenty-fifth. It was, of course, necessary to set the military wheels in motion, as these orders did, but the final decision was in my hands, and was not made until we were returning from Potsdam.

Dropping the bombs ended the war, saved lives, and gave the free nations a chance to face the facts.


When it looked as if Japan would quit, Russia hurried into the fray less than a week before the surrender, so as to be in at the settlement. No military contribution was made by the Russians toward victory over Japan. Prisoners were surrendered and Manchuria occupied by the Soviets, as was Korea, north of the 38th parallel.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd) HARRY S. Truman




Professor James L. Gato,
Department of History,
The University of Chicago,
1126 East 59th Street,
Chicago 37,
Illinois.



HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of Harry S. Truman
President's Secretary's Files



On April 25, 1945, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had an appointment with the President at the White House. Stimson later, in his book "On Active Service In Peace And War" wrote:

"When Stimson went to the White House on April 25, 1945, to discuss the atomic bomb with a President from whom hitherto the matter had been kept secret, he took with him a memorandum which dealt not so much with the military use of the bomb as with its long-range political meaning."

In his book Stimson quoted the memorandum as follows:

"1. Within four months we shall in all probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city.

"2. Although we have shared its development with the U.K., physically the U.S. is at present in the position of controlling the resources with which to construct and use it and no other nation could reach this position for some years.

"3. Nevertheless it is practically certain that we could not remain in this position indefinitely.

"a. Various segments of its discovery and production are widely known among many scientists in many countries, although few scientists are now acquainted with the whole process which we have developed.

"b. Although its construction under present methods requires great scientific and industrial effort and raw materials, which are temporarily mainly within the possession and knowledge of U.S. and U.K., it is extremely probable that much easier and cheaper methods of production will be discovered by scientists in the future, together with the use of materials of much wider distribution. As a result, it is extremely probable that the future will make it possible to be constructed by smaller nations or even groups, or at least by a large nation in a much shorter time.

"4. As a result, it is indicated that the future may see a time when such a weapon may be constructed in secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a willful nation or group against an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size and material power. With its aid even a very powerful unsuspecting nation might be conquered within a very few days by a very much smaller one. . . .

"5. The world in its present state of moral advancement compared with its technical development would be eventually at the mercy of such a weapon. In other words, modern civilization might be completely destroyed.

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of:
Eben A. Ayers

"6. To approach any world peace organization of any pattern now likely to be considered, without an appreciation by the leaders of our country of the power of this new weapon, would seem to be unrealistic. No system of control heretofore considered would be adequate to control this menace. Both inside any particular country and between the nations of the world, the control of this weapon will undoubtedly be a matter of the greatest difficulty and would involve such thorough-going rights of inspection and internal controls as we have never heretofore contemplated.

"7. Furthermore, in the light of our present position with reference to this weapon, the question of sharing it with other nations and, if so shared, upon what terms, becomes a primary question of our foreign relations. Also our leadership in the war and in the development of this weapon had placed a certain moral responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk without very serious responsibility for any disaster to civilization which it would further.

"8. On the other hand, if the problem of the proper use of this weapon can be solved, we would have the opportunity to bring the world into a pattern in which the peace of the world and our civilization can be saved.

.. ."



HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of:
Eben A. Ayers

In outlining the history of the development of the atomic bomb in his book, Stimson referred to a paper which he published in February, 1947, in Harper's Magazine and he quoted at length from that article.

He said that it was in the Fall of 1941 that the question of atomic energy was first brought directly to his attention. At that time President ^{Henry} Roosevelt appointed a committee consisting of Vice President/Wallace, General Marshall, Dr. Vannevar Bush, President of the Carnegie Institute of Washington, Dr. James B. Conant, President of Harvard University and himself to advise the President on questions of policy relating to the study of nuclear fission which was then proceeding both in the United States and Great Britain. He said that from May 1, 1943, until his resignation as Secretary of War on September 21, 1945, he was directly responsible to the President for administration of the entire undertaking with General Marshall, Bush, Conant and Major General Leslie R. Groves, the Officer-in-charge of the project, as his chief advisor.

He said the policy adopted and steadily pursued by Roosevelt and his advisors was to spare no effort in securing the earliest possible successful development of an atomic weapon. The original experimental achievement of atomic fission, he pointed out, had occurred in Germany in 1938 and it was known that the Germans had continued their experiments. In 1941 and 1942 they were believed to be ahead of us and it was vital that they should not be the first to bring atomic weapons into the field of battle.

"At no time, from 1941 to 1945," Stimson wrote, "did I ever hear it suggested by the President or by any other responsible member of the Government that atomic energy should not be used in the war." He said the entire purpose of the project was production of a military weapon; "on no other ground could the war-time expenditure of so much time and money have been justified."

Stimson, in addition to general supervision of the work of General Groves, became Chairman of a combined policy committee, composed of British and American officials and responsible directly to the President and Prime Minister Churchill.



Until 1944, Stimson said work on the atom was financed from funds "elastically" available from other appropriations but as expenditure increased it was decided that direct appropriation would be necessary. Therefore, in February, 1944, Stimson, Marshall and Bush took it up with Speaker Rayburn and Representatives McCormack and Martin, Democratic and Republican Leaders of the House, who piloted the necessary appropriation through the House without public discussion. A meeting in June with Senators Barkley, White, Bridges and Thomas of Oklahoma, brought similar results in the Senate. In 1945 additional large appropriations were likewise obtained.

Stimson said that as time went on it became clear that the weapon would not be available in time for use in an European war and that war was successfully ended without it. In the Spring of 1945, however, it became evident that the climax of the effort was nearing but it was impossible to state with certainty that success had been achieved until a bomb was actually exploded. A test was to be made at the Alamogordo Reservation in New Mexico.

On March 15, 1945, Stimson said he had his last talk with President Roosevelt. He said he took with him a memorandum which the President had sent him from an unnamed person "who had been alarmed at the rumors of extravagance in the Manhattan Project." This man suggested that a body of outside scientists be formed to pass upon the project because there were rumors that Bush and Conant had "sold the President a lemon on the subject and ought to be checked upon." He said it was a rather jittery and nervous memorandum and rather silly but that he was prepared for it and gave the President a list of the scientists who were actually engaged on the project to show their high standing. The list he said comprised four Nobel prize men

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

Papers of:
Eben A. Ayers

and practically every physicist of standing. He said he then outlined the future of it, and "went over with him the two schools of thought that exist in respect to the future control after the war of this project, in case it is successful, one of them being the secret close-in attempt to control the project by those who control it now, and the other being the international control based upon freedom both of science and of access." He told him that these things must be settled before the first projectile is used and that he must be ready with a statement to come out with the people on it just as soon as that is done. He agreed to that."



He said the conversation covered the three aspects of this question then uppermost in their minds — first that it was always necessary to suppress a lingering doubt that such a titanic undertaking could be successful; second the implications of success in terms of a long-range post-war effect; third the problem that would be presented at the time of the first use of the weapon, for with that first use he said there must be some public statement.

Stimson Committee → In April, Stimson set up a committee, charged with the functions of advising the President on the various questions raised "by our apparently imminent success in developing an atomic weapon." The committee, known as the Manhattan Committee consisted of Stimson as Chairman, George L. Harrison, who acted as Chairman in Stimson's absence; James F. Byrnes, then a private citizen, as personal representative of the President; Ralph A. Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy; William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State; Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research & Development, and President of the Carnegie Institute of Washington; Dr. Karl T. Compton, Chief of the Office of Scientific Research & Development, and President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Dr. James B. Conant, Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee, and President of Harvard University.

The committee's work included the drafting of statements issued immediately after the first bombs were dropped, preparation of a bill for domestic control of atomic energy, and recommendations looking toward international control of atomic energy.



On June 1st, this committee recommended that the bomb be used against Japan, without specific warning, as soon as possible and against such a target as to make its devastating strength clear.

Stimson wrote that an advisory panel of the distinguished atomic physicists reported that they could propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war -- "we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use." Stimson said that the conclusions of the committee were similar to his own although he reached his independently and he felt that to extract a genuine surrender from the Japanese Emperor and his military advisors there must be administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing truth of our power to destroy the Empire. He felt such an effective shock "would save many times the number of lives, both American and Japanese, that it would cost." He set forth an argument in support of his opinion which opinion he said was held not only by himself but by all his senior military advisors.

In July, 1945, although Japan had been seriously weakened, he said there was no indication of any weakening in the determination to fight rather than to accept unconditional surrender. Estimates of the War Department General Staff indicated that the Japanese army had a total strength of about five million men and there was a warm possibility that the Japanese Government might determine upon resistance to the end which would face the Allies with the task of destroying an armed force of five million men and five thousand suicide aircraft. Plans of the armed forces for the defeat of Japan had been prepared without reliance upon the atomic bomb. They included an intensified sea and air blockade, strategic air bombing through the summer and early fall to be

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of:
Edwin A. Ayers

followed on November 1st by invasion of the southern island of Kyushu. This to be followed by an invasion of the main island of Honshu in the Spring of 1946. The total United States military and naval force of five million men would be involved. He said they estimated that if we should be forced to carry this plan to a conclusion with major fighting it would not end until the latter part of 1946 at the earliest. With these thoughts in mind he wrote a memorandum for the President on July 2nd. This was prepared after general discussion and agreement with Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal. He said this was prompted not by the problem of atomic energy but by American desire to achieve a Japanese surrender without invading the home island.



The memorandum was of considerable length and bore the title "Proposed Program For Japan" and did not mention the atomic bomb. It would propose a carefully-timed warning to Japan before any invasion of the Empire was attempted. He said there was much discussion in Washington about the timing of this warning and that the controlling factor in the end was the date set for the Potsdam Conference. He said it was President Truman's decision that such a warning should be issued by the United States and the United Kingdom from this meeting, with the concurrence of the Head of the Chinese Government so that it would be plain that all Japan's enemies were united. This was done in the Potsdam ultimatum of July 26th. On July 28th, the Japanese Premier rejected the ultimatum.

The New Mexico test of the atomic bomb occurred on July 16th while the President was at Potsdam.

He said a list of suggested targets for the atom bomb was made up and he approved four, including the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The former was bombed on August 6th and the latter on August 9th.

Report prepared by Eben Ayers, White House
Assistant, ca. 1950-51

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of:
Eben A. Ayers

the same as you would an armored division to go around on the ground and cause the surrender and as you say when you go to win a war it takes the foot soldier, the armored division and artillery on the ground no matter what sort of weapons you have. It was the estimate of General Marshall that this action would probably save the lives of 250,000 of our soldiers and probably twice as many casualties - that was what I was trying to avoid.

Hillman - what the professor is trying to get at is despite the plastering from the air the ordinary bombs on Germany and Japan wouldn't have the effect of a knock-out blow.

Truman - the atomic bomb was the knock-out blow & the same as the armored division would have on the ground behind the enemy.

Royse - Mr. Stimson in his book says he urges a psychological blow which would perhaps be the means of making the Japanese give in and he keeps talking about that.

Truman - that is all right and, of course, in the long run it takes the psychological condition of the enemy's mind to cause a surrender but my objective was to use the atomic bomb purely as a military blow to create a military surrender. That in the long run is what happened. In the first world war if you will remember the Germans were not completely defeated - Germany was never invaded and never

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of
HARRY S. TRUMAN
POST-PRESIDENTIAL FILES

touched except by a few air raids which we made along toward the
end but the fact that nine hundred thousand Americans had marched
up to _____ and were about to take over caused them to surrender.
They never would have surrendered otherwise. I don't believe in
speculating on the mental feeling and as far as the bomb is concerned
I ordered its use for a military reason - for no other cause and it saved
the lives of a great many of our soldiers. That is all I had in mind.

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of
HARRY S. TRUMAN
POST-PRESIDENTIAL FILES

COPY

CITY OF HIROSHIMA
HIROSHIMA, JAPAN

March 1, 1958

Mr. Harry S. Truman
Indianapolis, Missouri
U. S. A.

Dear Mr. Truman:


Please find enclosed a copy of the English translation of the resolution made by the City Council of Hiroshima in connection with the statement you recently made concerning the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and on the hydrogen bomb.

The people of Hiroshima, who actually suffered the painful sting of the bomb, are naturally most keenly sensitive to the moral side of the nuclear weapons. It is our regret that your statement has urged us to make the resolution which we hereby forward you for your consideration.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Tsukasa Nitoguri

Chairman
Hiroshima City Council



RESOLUTION NO. 11

RESOLUTION TO DECLARE PROTEST AGAINST BROADCAST REMARKS OF MR.
TRUMAN, FORMER UNITED STATES PRESIDENT

The citizens of Hiroshima who have led their life in tribulation of more than two hundred thousand lives taken in sacrifice consider it their sublime duty to be a cornerstone of world peace and hold that no nation of the world should ever be permitted to repeat the error of using nuclear weapons on any people anywhere on the globe, whatever be the reason.

If, however, the statement made by Mr. Truman, former President of the United States, that he felt no compunction whatever after directing the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and that hydrogen bombs would be put to use in future in case of emergency be true, it is a gross defilement committed on the people of Hiroshima and their fallen victims.

We, the City Council, do hereby protest against it in deep indignation shared by our citizens and declare that in the name of humanity and peace we appeal to the wisdom of the United States and her citizens and to their inner voice for peace that said statement be retracted and that they fulfil their obligations for the cause of world peace.

Be it hereby resolved.

February 13, 1958

Hiroshima City Council

Submitted February 13, 1958.

By KAZUO MATSUSHITA, Hiroshima City Councilman
YOSHITO AMIMOTO
YOSHIO YOSHINAKA
KIYIOCHI TSUCHIOKA
MEIICHI MASUMURA

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of
HARRY S. TRUMAN
POST-PRESIDENTIAL FILES

The following letter was written March 12, 1958, by former President of the United States Harry S. Truman to Hon. Tsukasa Nitoguri, Chairman of the Hiroshima City Council, Hiroshima, Japan, in reply to the resolution passed by the Hiroshima City Council protesting Mr. Truman's recently televised comments on the dropping of the atomic bomb on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your courteous letter, enclosing the resolution of the Hiroshima City Council, was highly appreciated. The feeling of the people of your city is easily understood, and I am not in any way offended by the resolution which their city council passed.

However, it becomes necessary for me to remind the City Council, and perhaps you also, of some historical events.

In 1941, while a peace conference was in progress in Washington between representatives of the Emperor of Japan and the Secretary of State of the United States, representing the President and the Government of the United States, a naval expedition of the Japanese Government approached the Hawaiian Islands, a territorial part of the United States, and bombed our Pearl Harbor Naval Base. It was done without provocation, without warning and without a declaration of war.

Thousands of young American sailors and civilians were murdered by this unwarranted and unheralded attack, which brought on the war between the people of Japan and the people of the United States. It was an unnecessary and terrible act.

The United States had always been a friend of Japan from the time our great Admiral succeeded in opening the door to friendly relations between our two countries.

Our sympathies were with Japan in the war between Russia and Japan in the early 1900's. The President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, intervened and brought about a peace settlement.

But in the 1930's Japan joined the Axis Powers, and when the Hitler regime in Germany and Mussolini's government in Italy were defeated, Japan was left alone.

From Potsdam in 1945, before Russia declared war on Japan, Great Britain, China and the United States issued an ultimatum suggesting that Japan join the Germans and Italians in surrender. This document, sent to the Japanese Government through Sweden and Switzerland, evoked only a very curt and discourteous reply.

Our military advisers had informed Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain,

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of
HARRY S. TRUMAN
POST-PRESIDENTIAL FILES

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China and the President of the United States that it would require at least a million and a half Allied soldiers to land in the Tokyo plain and on the south island of Japan.

On July 16, 1945, before the demand for Japan's surrender was made, a successful demonstration of the greatest explosive force in the history of the world had been accomplished.

After a long conference with the Cabinet, the military commanders and Prime Minister Churchill, it was decided to drop the atomic bomb on two Japanese cities devoted to war work for Japan. The two cities selected were Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

When Japan surrendered a few days after the bomb was ordered dropped, on August 6, 1945, the military estimated that at least a quarter of a million of the invasion forces against Japan and a quarter of a million Japanese had been spared complete destruction and that twice that many on each side would, otherwise, have been maimed for life.

As the executive who ordered the dropping of the bomb, I think the sacrifice of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was urgent and necessary for the prospective welfare of both Japan and the Allies.

The need for such a fateful decision, of course, never would have arisen, had we not been shot in the back by Japan at Pearl Harbor in December, 1941.

And in spite of that shot in the back, this country of ours, the United States of America, has been willing to help in every way the restoration of Japan as a great and prosperous nation.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Harry S. Truman

Honorable Tsukasa Nitoguri
Chairman
Hiroshima City Council
Hiroshima
Japan

HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of
HARRY S. TRUMAN
POST-PRESIDENTIAL FILES

(1958)

FROM THE DESK OF
HARRY S. TRUMAN

Referring to
attached

The world is faced with
a situation that means either
total destruction or the great-
est age in history can be its
lot.

The decision must be made
and it must be made as
soon as possible. The great
nations and the great peoples
of the earth have all been through
trials and great difficulties down
through the ages. They have fought
each other for sovereignty and
control along with the exploitation
of their resources. All that has been
accomplished is a return to
old concepts and old ideas.



Down through the ages there
have been men whose concept
of life was to live creditably and
to help others to live happily.
The Chinese, the East Indians,
the Arabians, the Jews and the
comparatively modern day
Christians have produced
ideas and moral codes for
the ideal of men's living to-
gether in harmony.

Usually these great ideas have
been exploited by selfish rulers
and debauched priesthods for
~~selfish~~ power and control at the

FROM THE DESK OF
HARRY S. TRUMAN



experience of the very people
whom the great idealist wanted
to help.

Now we are faced with total
destruction. The old Hebrew
Prophets presented the idea
of the destruction of the world
by fire after their presentation
of a destruction by water.

Well that destruction is at
hand unless the great leaders
of the world present it.

Two thousand American Scien-
tists have present an Appeal to
the Governments and Peoples of



the World to the President
of the United States.

Eleven thousand scientists from forty nine nations have presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations in this year of 1958 a story of their spontaneous concern over the nuclear threat to humanity.

Those of the world who still believe in morality and justice are in the vast majority. That is true not only in the free nations but it is true in Russia, in China, in Spain in Portugal, in the near East, in

FROM THE DESK OF
HARRY S. TRUMAN



South America where the
dictators reside.

The leader of one of the
great nations whose voice
can be heard and listened
to should go to the Assembly
of the United Nations and ad-
vocate an international con-
trol of nuclear energy in the
interest of all mankind.

He should advocate an inter-
national police force for the
enforcement of control and
the maintenance of peace in
the Near East, the Far East,

FROM THE DESK OF
HARRY S. TRUMAN

the Pacific, the Atlantic
and all around the world.
No little dictator any where
should be permitted to op-
press his own people or to
use the methods of a demagogue
to upset the peace of the
world and bring about its
complete destruction.

This rule to apply to the
big ~~dictator~~ dictators and to
all nations free or slave
all around the world and
the may be destruction by fire

THE ORIGINAL OF THIS
DOCUMENT IS IN THE
SECURITY FILE OF THE
HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

FROM THE DESK OF
HARRY S. TRUMAN

*will not come about.
It is up to our leaders.*



HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY
Papers of
HARRY S. TRUMAN
POST-PRESIDENTIAL FILES